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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, immigration enforcement has provoked conflicts among
almost every level and branch of American government. Some disputes are hor-
izontal: between the President and Congress, governors and state legislatures,
sheriffs and boards of supervisors. Others are vertical: between states and feder-
al agencies, the President and governors, states and localities. Many of the con-
stitutional questions posed by these conflicts have entered the courts and
spawned large academic literatures. But at least one has not: federal power to
enlist state and local aid.
Attempts to secure such aid-which I will call "inducement strategies"-
are a pervasive feature of modern federalism. They take many forms, ranging
from simple solicitation, to financial incentives, to outright mandates. In one
form or another, they show up whenever the federal government lacks the re-
sources, or the political buy-in, to enforce a large regulatory program on its
own. Sites of federal creativity and local resistance, these interactions are where
broader visions of federal-state relations-partnership, hierarchy, bargaining,
competition-play out on the ground. Inducement strategies are testing consti-
tutional limits in areas as diverse as climate change,' health care, and marijuana
1. See Order, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1ooo (2016) (No. 15A773) (staying EPA
coal regulations pending resolution of, among others, a Tenth Amendment coer-
cion challenge); Brief of Petitioners at 78-86, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016) (asserting commandeering and coercion challenges).
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enforcement.' But in immigration law, they have generated some particularly
intense conflicts.
In 2015, the concept of a "sanctuary city"-one whose police and sheriffs do
not help enforce immigration law-burst into the national immigration debate.
In the preceding decade, a vast new interior enforcement system had come to
heavily rely on state and local police to identify and arrest deportable non-
citizens. Objecting to the attendant financial burdens and harm to police work,
a number of cities, counties, and states began to resist. By the summer of 2014,
hundreds of jurisdictions were refusing to cooperate, and later that year, federal
officials were forced to revisit their own policies.4
This tension came to the fore in July of 2015, after an unauthorized immi-
grant shot and killed a woman on a pier in San Francisco. The shooter had been
convicted of several immigration and drug crimes, and after being transferred
to San Francisco on an old warrant, he had been released pursuant to a local
non-cooperation policy.' A national furor erupted. Presidential candidates be-
gan calling for a "crack down" on cities like San Francisco.6 A host of politicians
began proposing legislation to punish cities and states that refused to cooper-
ate.! The issue remained in the foreground throughout the 2016 presidential
campaign.' Forcing local cooperation is now one of the main planks in the in-
2. See Bridget A. Fahey, Health Care Exchanges and the Disaggregation of States in the
Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 125 YALE L.J. F. 56 (2015), http://www
.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/FaheyPDF-zhtyvuqa.pdf [http://perma.cc/NVB6-SHL2].
3. See David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of
Federal Power To Regulate States, 35 CARDOzo L. REV. 567 (2013).
4. See infra Section I.A.3.
5. See Julia Preston, San Francisco Murder Case Exposes Lapses in Immigration En-
forcement, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.cOm/2015/07/o8/us/san-
francisco-murder-case-exposes-lapses-in-immigration-enforcement.htm
[http://perma.cclR9JQ-GLTP].
6. See Editorial, The Great "Sanctuary City" Slander, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2ol5/10/17/opinion/the-great-sanctuary-city-slander
.html [http://perma.cc/E42A-KYW3]; Elise Foley, Hillary Clinton Piles on San
Francisco Officials, Putting Sanctuary Cities Under Even More Heat, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 7, 2015, 10:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2ol5/o7/o7/
sanctuary-cities-n_7749406.html [http://perma.cc/GGF6-RVCJ].
7. E.g., Ted Barrett, Senate Set To Vote on Sanctuary City Bill, CNN (Oct. 20, 2015, 9:15
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/20/politics/sanctuary-cities-capitol-hill-vote/
[http://perma.cc/E4ER-54FJ]; Foley, supra note 6; Cristina Marcos, House Votes To
Punish Sanctuary Cities, HILL (July 23, 2015, 4:21 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
floor-action/house/249003-house-votes-to-punish-sanctuary-cities [http://perma
.cc/Y8U2-AEBB].
8. See, e.g., Theodore Schleifer, South Carolina Television Stations Pull Anti-Rubio Ad
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coming administration's immigration platform.9 A lurking question has thus
come to the surface: how far can the federal government go to demand state
and local support?
The question comes at a time of uncertainty in the law of cooperative fed-
eralism."o In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), the
Supreme Court struck down a spending condition as unconstitutionally coer-
cive for the first time in history." In doing so, it reopened some federalism
questions that date back to the 198os and 1990s, when the Court established that
Congress could regulate state entities alongside private ones, but could not
commandeer states' regulatory services. In the wake of NFIB, scholars, courts,
and lawyers must grapple with some new questions. How do coercion and
commandeering fit together? Does NFIB tell us anything deeper about the na-
ture of American federalism?
Immigration law provides especially fertile ground for thinking about those
questions because of how deeply the federal government now relies on state as-
sistance. Our immigration system delegates a large portion of immigrant
screening to back-end enforcement," one of whose primary criteria is crimi-
nality. But the federal government lacks the physical resources and constitu-
tional authority to widely access that criterion-only states can enforce general
criminal law. As a result, interior enforcement now functions largely as an ad-
junct to state criminal justice systems. In perhaps no other realm of federal pol-
icy does enforcement so depend on state and local aid. 14
9. See Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump Wants To Do in
His First loo Days, NPR (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/2ol6/I1/og/
501451368/here-is-what-donald-trump-wants-to-do-in-his-first-loo-days [http://
perma.cc/C2C7-WREF] ("[On the first day, I will... cancel all federal funding to
Sanctuary Cities.").
10. By "cooperative federalism," I mean the joint administration of federal regulatory
programs, whether they involve state entities disbursing federal funds, federal and
state regulators developing joint regulatory standards, or collaborative enforce-
ment of the sort that happens in immigration law. I use the term very generally to
describe any federal-state or federal-local regulatory interaction.
11. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The provision conditioned states' existing Medicaid funds
on their agreeing to participate in the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion.
12. See generally Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immi-
gration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007) (describing the "second-order" nature of
immigrant screening).
13. See generally Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and
Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012) (exploring possible reasons
why).
14. See Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority To Issue
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 174-76 (20o8); Peter H.
Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 71-77
("[Wihere enforcement against criminal aliens is concerned... federal immigra-
90
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To maintain that link, different federal actors have used or proposed a
number of boundary-pushing inducement strategies. The approaches vary
widely in the amount of pressure they apply. Some involve simple solicitation of
aid, or unilateral offers of resources and authority. Others trade federal funds
and services for local assistance. Harsher proposals involve threats to punish re-
sistance by cutting off pre-existing federal grants. Several even ban certain
forms of refusal outright, or mandate certain forms of participation. These dif-
ferent forms of pressure share a common tendency to locate enforcement deci-
sions in increasingly lower levels of the state criminal-justice hierarchy. But they
imply widely divergent visions of federal-state relations.
They also fit uneasily into federalism's existing doctrine and theory. The
Supreme Court in NFIB updated its inducement jurisprudence to prohibit cer-
tain spending threats; as Part II argues, its cooperative federalism cases now co-
here around what I call a "right of refusal," a narrow but absolute right against
certain forms of inducement. But the Court-and, for the most part, the lower
courts-have had little occasion to grapple with many of the strategies being
tested in the immigration sphere. Those strategies include mandates to share
information, prohibitions against non-cooperation policies, and funding
threats directed at local actors. As I explain in Part III, each of these strategies is
in some tension with the Court's emerging federalism jurisprudence.
These unique forms of integration similarly cut across existing scholarly ac-
counts of how our federal system functions, or should function. They shed new
empirical light on old debates about how to promote local autonomy and
strengthen political accountability. They also show how federalism can protect
individual liberty and encourage a robust national debate. In other words, im-
migration is on the front lines of today's federalism, whose law and theory must
now account for it. The converse is also true. The structure of immigration pol-
icy is now very sensitive to the changing norms of cooperative federalism. The
coevolution of immigration and federalism promises to profoundly shape both.
Despite this rich terrain, scholars of immigration federalism have largely
focused on other constitutional questions. A vast literature has explored ques-
tions of state power and preemption." This tracks the federalism controversies
that have generated the most litigation in the last decade, such as Arizona's S.B.
1070 and similar laws. After the 2016 presidential election, however, questions of
federal inducement power loom on the horizon." And while earlier scholarship
tion officials are practically impotent without the substantial help of the state and
local criminal justice systems.").
15. See, e.g., Ming H. Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism: Toward a Doc-
trinal Framework, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1087 (2014); Pratheepan Gulasekaram &
Karthik Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2074 (2013); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Fed-
eralism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise
of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2oo8).
16. Around 400 subfederal jurisdictions currently have non-cooperation policies. See
Jasmine C. Lee, Rudy Omri & Julia Preston, What Are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y.
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has examined the question of whether state and local police should choose to
participate,1 7 none has subjected the range of federal inducement practices to
sustained doctrinal and theoretical scrutiny.18
Scholars of federalism, meanwhile, have largely treated immigration as a
footnote. As they have identified new modes of integration and begun to recon-
cile them with the Court's federalism jurisprudence,9 few have looked closely at
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2ol6/o9/02/US/
sanctuary-cities.html [http://perma.cc/7SUH-FXMW]. The new administration
has promised to make local enforcement a core feature of its immigration policy.
See Kelly & Sprunt, supra note 9. At the same time, a growing number of mayors
have announced their intention to resist federal efforts to enlist their police. See
Alex Dobuzinskis & Joseph Ax, Mayors of NY and Los Angeles Pledge To Remain
Immigrant Sanctuaries, REUTERS (Nov. 1o, 2016, 9:12 PM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-immigration-sanctuarycities-idUSKBN3604P [http://perma
.ccl2YM6-7P48].
17. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Repre-
sentative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247 (2012)
(arguing against local participation); Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force
Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69
ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005) (arguing for local participation); Michael J. Wishnie, State
and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004)
(arguing against local participation). In this Article, I mostly avoid this terrain. In-
stead, my concern is for the rules and modes of interaction that will determine
who can act on their policy preferences.
18. Many of the interactions I explore in Sections I.B and I.C-including notification
mandates, local funding threats, and intrastate inducement dynamics-have re-
ceived extremely limited academic attention. To be sure, scholars have examined
many federal-local interactions individually. See Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off
Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual Defiance of Federal Immigration En-
forcement, 47 CONN. L. REV. 101 (2014) (fingerprint sharing under Secure Commu-
nities); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Im-
migration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683 (2009)
(discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012)); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportations, and
Crime Victims Afraid To Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449 (2006) (same); Chris-
topher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46
LOY. L. REV. 629 (2012) (analyzing the legality of immigration detainers); Huyen
Pham, The Constitutional Right Not To Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Feder-
al Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (20o6) (same). Others have examined
attempts to enlist local aid through more specific lenses, like privacy. See Anil
Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Sur-
veillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1106 (2013); Anil Kalhan, The Fourth
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1137 (2008). Many of these studies pre-date NFIB. None have sought
to identify the full range of inducement interactions, assess their constitutional
dimensions, or situate them within the broader federalism literature.
19. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L.
REV. 953 (2016); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Feder-
alism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American
92
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the encounters taking place in the immigration realm.20 Perhaps this has
stemmed from a perception that immigration is different, a self-contained area
of law whose rules and patterns cannot be generalized. That may be true of
some federalism questions, such as state authority to regulate migration, which
is uniquely constrained.2 1 But the Supreme Court has given no indications that
procedural constraints on federal power-commandeering, state sovereign
immunity, coercion, spending conditions, and the like-vary from one area of
substantive law to the next. Immigration therefore presents the opportunity to
test federalism doctrine and theory where federal-state integration is tightest.
This Article begins that project. Its goals are three-fold: to document and
categorize the inducement interactions taking place in immigration law; to
measure them against the evolving constitutional rules that govern federal-state
interaction; and to ask what they portend for the practice of immigration en-
forcement and the study of federalism going forward.
To set the scene for this discussion, Part I explores immigration law's histo-
ry of integration, resistance, and inducement. It presents a taxonomy of in-
ducements and examines their collective tendency to put downward pressure
on state enforcement discretion-from state actors to local ones, and from poli-
cymakers to employees.
Part II identifies the constitutional rules that govern federal attempts to se-
cure state participation. I argue that, in NFIB, the Supreme Court assimilated
the commandeering and coercion doctrines into a broader principle-the
Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1561 (2015); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federal-
ism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New
Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of In-
teractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).
20. The same is true of the literature on "administrative federalism," which has largely
ignored the joint administration of immigration law. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies
at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Adminis-
trative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (20o8); Miriam Seifter, Feder-
alism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2014).
There are some exceptions. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Con-
flict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094
(2014) (using immigration policy as a prominent part of the argument that feder-
alism serves as a framework for airing competing views and ultimately forging na-
tional consensus); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2011)
(using one federal-local immigration interaction-the 287(g) program-as an ex-
ample of "negotiated federalism"); see also infra Section I.A.2 (explaining the
287(g) program).
21. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power
Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 603 (2013) (arguing that in immigration preemp-
tion cases, "[i]t is as if a very heavy thumb has been placed on the federal govern-
ment's side of the scale"); Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of
Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33 (describing Arizona's analysis as "a rad-
ical departure from conventional approaches to preemption").
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"right of refusal"-which is narrow in scope but flexible in reach. It prevents
the federal government from using inducement strategies-even those that do
not technically commandeer or condition funds-whose intent or effect is to
deny states and localities the ability to withhold their regulatory assistance. It
otherwise leaves intact federal authority to regulate subfederal governments di-
rectly, or to offer incentives to encourage participation. This larger principle
brings greater coherence to the case law and generates predictions about the fu-
ture path of the doctrine.
.With the immigration and federalism terrains thus mapped, the rest of the
Article puts them together. Part III considers the legality of the most forceful
inducement approaches, and argues that some of them are in serious tension
with the right of refusal. Part IV shifts to theoretical territory, asking how recent
experience intersects with some of the normative claims in the wider federalism
literature. This Part shows how immigration law provides fresh insights into
perennial questions about state autonomy, inter-systemic debate, rights protec-
tion, and accountability. Finally, Part V concludes by meditating on the inter-
twined futures of immigration enforcement and cooperative federalism.
I. INDUCEMENT STRATEGIES IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
The federal government uses inducement strategies in the context of con-
crete policy programs. This Part charts the emergence of federal-state integra-
tion as a central feature of interior immigration enforcement. It then presents a
taxonomy of inducement strategies and distills their deeper dynamics. Those
dynamics are the raw material for the doctrinal and theoretical discussions that
follow.
A. Integration in Immigration Enforcement
Our immigration enforcement system has undergone profound changes in
the last three decades." Three overlapping stories are most relevant to the pre-
sent federalism landscape: first, the birth and expansion of interior enforce-
ment; second, the emergence of criminality as the main criterion of interior en-
22. Others have covered similar ground. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, Overcriminaliz-
ing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 630-47 (2012) (detailing the
expansion of immigration enforcement over the last several decades); Doris
Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formi-
dable Machinery, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Jan. 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy
.org/sites/default/files/publications/enforcementpillars.pdf [http://perma.cc/
M8RG-G3LM] (same). My aim, in this Part, is more specific-to tease out the par-
ticular phenomenon of federal reliance on, and resulting pursuit of, state aid. That
means highlighting some facets over others: interior over border; criminal law as a
tool, not a model, for immigration enforcement; federal attempts to encourage lo-
cal participation, not reign it in.
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forcement; and third, an increasing focus on (and opposition to) using subfed-
eral resources and authority to access that criterion.
1. The Birth of the Modern System
In the early 1980s, immigration enforcement was a smaller and less formal
project than it is today. The entire Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) employed fewer than twelve thousand people and operated on an annual
budget well below $i billion (three decades later, those numbers are around
ninety thousand and $18 billion, respectively). 24 Most deportations consisted of
informal "returns,"25 which carried few legal consequences. Border agents
openly allowed seasonal flows of migrant workers, who came from Mexico to
work in agriculture and then returned home.
The number of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States
reached 3.2 million in 1986," as waves of refugees fled brutal civil wars in Nica-
ragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Their reception was complicated by the
Reagan Administration's support for the governments of Guatemala and El Sal-
vador, which many of the refugees were fleeing. In their INS proceedings, the
23. Limited federal-local collaboration existed before the 198os, but it was "local and
ad hoc," whereas today it is "national, automated, and comprehensive." Rachel E.
Rosenbloom, Policing Sex, Policing Immigrants: What Crimmigration's Past Can
Tell Us About Its Present and Its Future, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 149,197 (2016).
24. Meissner et al., supra note 22, at 16; Justice Mgmt. Div., Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service: Authorized Positions 1975-2oo3, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 104-05 (Spring
2002), http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/pdf/pagelo4-io8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E937-F3RN]; FY 2013 Budget in Brief, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC.
81, 91, 155 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-
fy2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6UR-W99Y] (reporting 61,160 CBP employees, 20,265
ICE employees, and 10,700 CIS employees in fiscal year 2013).
25. Office of Immigration Statistics, 2013 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP'T
HOMELAND SEC. 103 tbl.39 (Aug. 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/ois-yb_20130.pdf [http://perma.cc/NTL8-UPRR]. For instance,
in 1986, there were 1,586,320 returns and 24,592 removals-a ratio of sixty-five to
one.
26. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33874, UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES SINCE 1986, at 3 fig.1 (2012), http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33874.pdf [http://perma.cc/J82E-QXH6] (describing
"a rather fluid movement of migratory workers along the southern border," which
was later "stymied" by tightened enforcement).
27. Id.
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State Department would often weigh in against granting asylum." As a result,
many migrants from those countries did not have a path to legal status.29
Objecting to this state of affairs, churches and other private groups began
declaring themselves "sanctuaries" and offering shelter, medical care, bond, and
legal services to undocumented migrants.30 Local governments joined the
movement too, adopting sanctuary policies that declared opposition to federal
refugee policy and prohibited discrimination by city employees against Guate-
malans and Salvadorans." Other sanctuary provisions were more operational.
They prohibited city employees-most significantly, the police-from taking a
number of immigration-related actions, such as inquiring into status, arresting
based on civil violations, and reporting those without status to the federal gov-
ernment.32 These were the first generation of local non-cooperation policies. In
all, about two dozen cities and four states adopted some sort of sanctuary policy
in the 198os.33
In 1986, after years of negotiation, Congress reached a compromise to ad-
dress the undocumented population then living in the United States. The Im-
migration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) offered one-time legalization to
about half of this population.34 In exchange, it enacted the first ban against em-
ploying undocumented immigrants, which remains in effect today.35 Its theory
was that fewer migrants would come to the United States if they could not
work. This was the federal government's first widespread interior enforcement
28. Pablo Lastra, Who Counts as a Refugee in US Immigration Policy-and Who
Doesn't, NATION (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/who-counts-
refugee-us-immigration-policy-and-who-doesnt/ [http://perma.cc/UJA2-JKHT].
29. Asylum approval rates for Salvadorans and Guatemalans were below three percent
in 1984. See Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2oo6), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article
/central-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era [http://perma.cc/9XZS-8HYM].
Eventually the courts started requiring immigration judges to take a second look.
See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
30. See Pham, supra note 18, at 1382-83.
31. See Hing, supra note 17, at 253 (describing a "genre of policies that can be classified
as expressions of 'solidarity' with the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s").
32. Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Lo-
cal Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 51-54 (1994).
33. See Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbol-
ism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 297, 311-16 (1989); Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 1o6 MICH. L.
REV. 567, 600-o5 (20o8);
34. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1oo Stat. 3359 (1986).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012). Employers who violate the ban are subject to civil fines
and criminal penalties. See id. § 1324a(f). The work prohibition has never been ro-
bustly enforced. Meissner et al., supra note 22, at 76-77.
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initiative. IRCA thus introduced the model for modern statutes addressed to
unauthorized migration: trading relief for enforcement.36
IRCA also directed the enforcement bureaucracy to shift more attention to
immigrants with criminal records-an instruction that necessarily contem-
plates interior enforcement.37 In response, the INS created two programs to
identify deportable immigrants in state custody and initiate deportation pro-
ceedings during their sentences.3' These policies were the precursors for the
modern federal-local enforcement architecture. That same year, Congress creat-
ed a new category of crime called "aggravated felonies"-which initially includ-
ed only drugs and weapons trafficking and murder-and directed the INS to
focus its efforts on immigrants convicted of those crimes.9 Two years later,
Congress expanded the list of aggravated felonies, and issued instructions for
the INS to prepare a "criminal alien census" and a "plan for the prompt remov-
al from the United States of criminal aliens."40
2. Expansion and Convergence
Our enforcement system underwent tectonic changes in the two decades af-
ter IRCA. This is when most of the current undocumented population arrived
in the United States.4' It is also when the antecedents for the modern system
were put in place: extensive funding for interior enforcement, widespread use of
36. Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 201-03 (describing the political trade
of legalization for employer sanctions). Efforts at comprehensive reform in 2007
and 2013 employed the same structure. See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Op-
portunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013); Com-
prehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 1348, noth Cong. (2007).
37. See Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 701, 100 Stat. 3359,
3445 (1986); see also MARC R. ROSENBLUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42057,
INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 11-
12 (2012), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42057.pdf [http://perma.cc/5RJC-
CSUL].
38. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 37, at 12 & n.42; LISA M. SEGHETrI, STEPHEN R. VINA &
KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW:
THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (2009), http://www.au
.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf [http://perma.cc/22BT-VVNR.
39. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. oo-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (1988).
40. Immigration Act, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 501, 510, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048, 5051-52
(1990).
41. Eighty-two percent of the undocumented population as of January 2012 entered
the country after 1990. Sixty-nine percent entered between 1990 and 2004. See Bry-
an Baker & Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Re-
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detention and criminal sanctions, and a variety of mechanisms to encourage lo-
cal participation.
Two statutes in the mid-199os extended IRCA's nod toward integrating
criminal and immigration enforcement. The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA) created the State Criminal Alien Assistance
Program (SCAAP), which reimburses states and localities for a small portion of
the cost of detaining non-citizens.42 By tying reimbursement to immigration
status, SCAAP encourages jails and prisons to collect inmates' citizenship and
status information. That same year, the INS created the Law Enforcement Sup-
port Center (LESC), a 24-hour hotline for local police to check arrestees' immi-
gration records.43
In 1996, Congress dramatically intensified the enforcement system. The Il-
legal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), along
with other statutes enacted the same year, streamlined and hardened many as-
pects of the deportation process.4 4 Four features are most relevant to current
federal-state integration.
First, IIRIRA expanded the conviction-based grounds for deportation, en-
larged the definition of aggravated felonies, and cut off some avenues for depor-
tation relief.45 Together, these changes meant that a larger set of people could
now be deported from the interior. It also expanded the mandate of the INS
programs that worked with states and leveraged arrests and convictions.46
Second, the statute introduced new procedures-expedited removal, rein-
statement of removal, and administrative removal47-to accelerate formal de-
42. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1o8 Stat. 1796 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i) (2012)).
43. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-95-147, LAW ENFORCEMENT
SUPPORT CENTER: NAME-BASED SYSTEMS LIMIT ABILITY TO IDENTITY ARRESTED
ALIENS 4 (1995), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ai95147.pdf [http://perma.cc/
HZ6D-9DYX].
44. Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11o et seq., 1221 et seq., 1324, 1363(a)).
See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation
Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000) (de-
scribing the range of reforms).
45. Other statutes that expanded the list of aggravated felonies include the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) and
the Immigration and Nationality Technical Correction Act, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
108 Stat. 4305 (1994).
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
46. ROSENBLUM, supra note 37, at 12.
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (expedited removal); id. § 1231(a) (reinstatement); id.
§ 1228 (administrative removal). While expedited removal primarily takes place at
the border, it can be (and has been) extended inland in certain circumstances. See
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 807 (5th ed. 2009).
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portations. This helped facilitate the rise of interior enforcement by making it
cheaper and faster.
Third, IIRIRA introduced a system of mandatory detention; immigrants
convicted of aggravated felonies now had to be detained during their removal
proceedings.4' This spurred the agency to build and contract for more deten-
tion space, which gave agents a place to take the people they picked up from lo-
cal jails.
Fourth, the statute adopted two new approaches to securing local participa-
tion. One was the "287(g) program," under which local law enforcement agen-
cies could directly enforce the civil immigration laws under the supervision of
federal officials.49 While IIRIRA authorized the program, the INS would not
begin to implement it until 2002.0 The other approach was a provision, 8
U.S.C. § 1373, aimed at preventing local resistance by preempting certain sanc-
tuary policies-those that restricted the sharing of immigration-status infor-
mation with federal officials." These programs were designed to translate crim-
inal-law arrests and incarceration into immigration enforcement action.
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
49. Id. § 1357(g). The INS did not begin using this authority until 2002. See Randy
Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: A Study of287(g) State and Local Immigra-
tion Enforcement, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. 9 (Jan. 2011), http://www.migration
policy.org/sites/default/files/publications/287g-divergence.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5VEH-MSTU].
50. ROSENBLUM, supra note 37, at 16.
51. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)-(b) ("[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or offi-
cial may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official
from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of
any individual."); see also id. § 1373(b) (imposing the same prohibition). The wel-
fare reform statute contained a similar provision. See id. § 1644 (roughly the
same). For simplicity's sake, I will refer to the two anti-sanctuary statutes together
as "§ 1373."
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Figure 1: INS Employees and Budget
Along with IIRIRA came successive increases in funding and hiring at the
INS. Its workforce nearly doubled over the course of the 199os, and the budget
nearly quadrupled.52 With more resources came more enforcement. Both re-
movals and returns increased precipitously during the first Bush and Clinton
Administrations, though still mostly at the border. Over the course of the dec-
ade, returns doubled and removals shot up more than eight-fold.53 The biggest
expansions of interior enforcement, however, were still to come.
The 9/11 attacks changed immigration law profoundly. Mindful that the at-
tackers were foreigners here on tourist visas, the federal government began to
treat unauthorized immigration as a national security problem and not an eco-
nomic issue.54 In 2002, Congress transferred the INS's enforcement functions
into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).55 In addition, the Ex-
ecutive Branch began actively recruiting local police and sheriffs' departments
into immigration enforcement.
This recruitment proceeded along multiple fronts. In 2002, the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) released a memorandum concluding that states had in-
herent authority, as sovereigns, to make arrests for civil immigration violations,
52. See Justice Mgmt. Div., supra note 24, at 107.
53. Id.
54. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforce-
ment: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/1n America, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 15
(2006) (noting the paradigm shift).
55. See Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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even without express federal authorization.56 To facilitate those arrests, the FBI
started including immigration status information in the federal database that
local police check for outstanding warrants and prior convictions, the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC). 7 This gave every law enforcement officer in
the United States instant access to a person's immigration data." To encourage
them to use that tool, federal officials began personally soliciting local involve-
ment.9
Some localities signed on. Inquiries to the LESC steadily increased. After six
years of dormancy, DHS started signing up local law enforcement agencies for
the 287(g) program in 2002.60 By 2012, there were fifty-seven 287(g) agreements
in effect, though today only thirty-two remain.'
Others resisted. A number of cities and states expanded old or adopted new
non-cooperation policies, which either prohibited police from asking arrestees
about immigration status, prevented them from reporting it to DHS, or both.12
This was the second generation of non-cooperation policies. Unlike in the
198os, when sanctuary policies generally stemmed from substantive disagree-
ment with federal decisions-namely, the failure to protect certain Central
American refugees-the sanctuary policies of the early 200os responded to
more procedural concerns. The primary reason cited by state and local govern-
ments was that immigrants, their families, and their communities would not
cooperate with local police if they thought the police were a conduit to the de-
56. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Att'y Gen. (Apr. 3, 2002),
http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf [http://perma.cc/T2CD-345E].
57. The Regulatory Plan, 67 Fed. Reg. 74,158, 74,159 (Dec. 9, 2002). See generally Na-
tional Crime Information Center, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
services/cjis/ncic [http://perma.cc/7PJ5-YCSL].
58. See Kalhan, supra note 18, at 1162 (explaining the new use of the NCIC); Wishnie,
supra note 17, at 1095-97 (same).
59. See Pham, supra note 18, at 1386 (describing solicitation); Wishnie, supra note 17, at
1087 (same).
60. ROSENBLUM, supra note 37, at 16. Most agreements were signed after 2006. Id.
There are two kinds of 287(g) contracts: jail screening, in which local officials in-
terrogate inmates and run their names through immigration databases; and task
forces, in which local officers police for immigration violations alongside their
normal criminal-law duties. Id. at 16-17 (describing both types).
61. The fifty-severi 287(g) agreements in 2012 included thirty-two for jail screening,
seventeen for task force policing, and eight for both. Id. ICE has since canceled the
task force agreements. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Im-
migration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://
www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g [http://perma.cc/L8R2-MBB2].
62. Kittrie, supra note 18, at 1467-68 (listing policies); Pham, supra note 18, at 1387
(same). Professor Bill Ong Hing counted more than seventy jurisdictions with
some sort of non-cooperation policy as of 2012, before the current wave of anti-
detainer policies began. See Hing, supra note 17, at 248-49.
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portation system." The same reasoning applied to other government services as
well. This resistance did not stem from disagreement with any particular en-
forcement outcomes, but from disagreement with using local police to achieve
those outcomes.
Meanwhile, crime-based enforcement was rapidly expanding. The budget
for the main interior enforcement sub-agency within DHS doubled from 2004
to 20o8.64 Its budget for programs connected to state criminal justice systems
rose even faster, increasing by a factor of twenty-seven over a period of five
years.5 These increases meant that by 2008, funding was in place for wide-
spread arrest- and conviction-based immigration enforcement. With more
funding came more removals, which doubled from 189,026 in 2001 to 359,795 in
20o8, the final year of the Bush Administration.66
The link between crimes and deportation was also tightening in other ways.
DHS's detention resources-necessary for holding immigrants taken from state
prisons and local jails-had spiked since IIRIRA introduced mandatory deten-
tion. In 2oo8, capacity was five times higher than in 1994.67 Changes at the bor-
der also facilitated federal-state integration during this time. More people each
year were being either formally removed or prosecuted for immigration
crimes." Formal removal keeps a person's name in immigration databases,
63. See, e.g., Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State, Tribal and Local Law En-
forcement, INT'L ASs'N CHIEFS POLICE 1 (2004), http://www.markwynn.com
/trafficking/enforcing-immigration-law-the-role-of-state-tribal-and-local-le-2004
.pdf [http://perma.cc/GD7Y-3JB7] (warning of "a chilling effect on both legal and
illegal aliens reporting criminal activity or assisting police in criminal investiga-
tions"); see also Harris, supra note 54, at 33-37 (describing the range of resistance to
federal entreaties); id. at 37 ("By far, the most frequent and impassioned objection
that came from state and local police concerned their own effectiveness: becoming
players in the enforcement of immigration law would be bad police work, plain
and simple.").
64. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 37, at 24 (describing Enforcement and Removal Opera-
tions (ERO), within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)); id. at 24 tbl.s
(showing overall ERO budget of $959.7 million in FY 2004 and $2.4 billion in
20o8). By fiscal year 2013, the ERO budget had reached $2.8 billion. Id.
65. Id. (FY 2004 = $23.4 million; FY 2005 = $69 million; FY 2006 = $199.9 million; FY
20o8 = $641.1 million).
66. Office of Immigration Statistics, supra note 25, at 103.
67. Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 11o COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 42,
44-45 & n.21 (2010). Detention spending increased too. ERO's budget for "custody
operations" doubled from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. See Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Budget Expenditures: FY 2oo5-FY 2oo, TRANSACTIONAL RECS.
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/224/
include/3.html [http://perma.cc/NE6G-Y3S2].
68. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., STREAMLINE:
MEASURING ITS EFFECT ON ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING 4-7 (2015), http://www.oig
.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-95_Mayl5.pdf [http://perma.cc/5FED-3NLB]
(describing the origin and expansion of Operation Streamline, which resulted in a
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which marks them as deportable if they reenter and later come into contact
with local police. More border prosecutions mean that more of the immigrants
found in the interior will have criminal convictions, and thus fall within the
conviction-based federal enforcement priorities that can trigger federal-local
collaboration.
This criminal focus would soon sharpen even further. Shortly after 9/11,
Congress had instructed federal law enforcement agencies to integrate their da-
tabases.69 In 2007, Congress appropriated $200 million for the development of a
new initiative to connect the FBI's biometric database with DHS's in order to
identify removable non-citizens who came into contact with state and local po-
lice.70 In the last few months of the Bush Administration, DHS began to move
beyond the pilot phase. This program would weave together all the threads
from the previous decade: a focus on the interior, integration with criminal law,
and reliance on local police. In 2008, it was renamed Secure Communities.
3. The Present Federalism Impasse
Secure Communities was slowly rolled out over the next four years.71 It is
"the largest expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement in the
nation's history." 2 Anytime a person is booked by a law enforcement agency in
the United States, their fingerprints are sent to the FBI. 73 Secure Communities
links the FBI database to a DHS database of people who have come into contact
with the immigration system.74 The program thus allows DHS to screen every
arrestee in the country for potential deportability.
seven-fold increase in the criminal prosecution of unauthorized border crossers);
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (immigration crime of illegal reentry); id. § 1325
(crime of illegal entry).
69. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 §§ 403, 413, 414, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
70. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007).
A pilot program had started in late 2006.
71. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87,
99-100 (2013) (showing activation pattern from late 2009 to mid-2012). Counties
are the relevant jurisdiction because, in most states, county sheriffs control the
jails, where inmates are held before trial and on short sentences, even when city
police are the ones who made the arrest.
72. See id. at 93 ("In short, Secure Communities is the largest expansion of local in-
volvement in immigration enforcement in the nation's history.").
73. See Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div., Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identifica-
tion System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (2012), http://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/about-us-cjis-fingerprints biometrics-biometric-center-of-excellences
-iafis_o808_one-pager825 [http://perma.cc/HZJ5-3NP2].
74. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM 5 (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.dhs
.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy-pia-usvisit-ident_
appendixj-jan2ol3.pdf [http://perma.cc/7HZP-52PY] (describing the DHS data-
base).
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At first, DHS signed agreements with state officials before activating Secure
Communities within their states.75 Many states signed up, but others balked.76
As resistance grew, on August 5, 2011, DHS announced that the program was
actually mandatory, and that states could not back out.77 It rescinded all the
agreements that had been signed up to that point, explaining that they were no
longer necessary78 Many state officials and advocacy groups protested this re-
versal,9 but because Secure Communities simply sends fingerprints from one
federal agency to another, local police had no way to prevent its operation,
short of not sending fingerprints to the FBI.so
A subtle but important shift happened when DHS announced that Secure
Communities would be mandatory. In the previous decade, as the federal gov-
ernment sought to enlist local support-whether through the 287(g) program,
the 2002 OLC memo, the expansion of the NCIC, or direct solicitations by
agency officials-its means were mostly precatory, encouraging participation
without forcing the issue. And while Congress had passed laws in 1996 that for-
mally prohibited some non-participation, the federal government had never en-
forced them, and they had been largely ignored."' Now, for the first time, the
administration imposed a form of unwanted participation that many states and
localities had already opposed.
Secure Communities intersects with an older federal effort to connect state
prisons and local jails to the immigration system. Agents from its interior en-
forcement arm, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), search in per-
75. Julia Preston, Immigration Program Is Rejected by Third State, N.Y. TIMES (June 6,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2ons/o6/o7/us/politics/o7immig.html [http://
perma.cc/VS4D-XK7R].
76. Id.; Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, Governor, N.Y., Governor Cuomo Suspends
Participation in Federal Secure Communities Program (June 1, 2011), http://
www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-suspends-participation-federal-
secure-communities-program [http://perma.cc/DP6X-LE6S]; Julia Preston, States
Resisting Program Central to Obama's Immigration Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (May 5,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/o6/us/o6immigration.html [http://perma
.cc/V4WY-USCD].
77. See Kirk Semple & Julia Preston, Deal To Share Fingerprints Is Dropped, Not Pro-




80. There is some dispute as to whether DHS misled state governments about whether
they could opt out of Secure Communities' fingerprint sharing. Its Inspector Gen-
eral's report, which exonerated the agency of intentionally misleading the states,
acknowledged a number of instances in which agency officials told state govern-
ments they could decline. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., COMMUNICATION REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN SECURE COMMUNITIES 8-12
(June 23, 2014), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2o12/OIG-12-66Jun4.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V6W6-GG33).
81. Pham, supra note 18, at 1385; supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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son, by reading jail logs and interrogating detainees. This occurs under the aegis
of a program called the Criminal Alien Program, which traces its roots back to
the post-IRCA jail-based initiatives."8 The Criminal Alien Program accounts for
some of ICE's funding spike over the last decade: from $6.6 million in 2004 to
$322.4 million in 2015-a fifty-fold increase. By some estimates, "[b]etween
two-thirds and three-quarters of individuals removed from the interior of the
United States are removed through [the Criminal Alien Program]. "83 It can be
hard to separate different programs, because their operations overlap and em-
ployees are not necessarily assigned to one or the other. But collectively, DHS's
prison- and jail-focused programs-in other words, those that rely on state and
local participation-account for the vast majority of its interior enforcement
activity.
How does the linkage play out in practice? Once a state or local inmate
comes to ICE's attention, the agency gets custody in one of two ways. The first
is to ask the jailer for notification in advance of the person's release date. This
allows ICE agents to pick them up, transport them to immigration detention,
and either initiate proceedings or use the expedited procedures introduced in
1996.84 This method is not always possible though. There are many reasons a
person might be released from local custody-charges not filed, charges
dropped, plea deals, sentences of time served or probation only, making bail-
and many of them do not allow for advanced warning. To address this issue, in
2007 ICE started relying heavily on a second way to gain custody: the immigra-
tion detainer.
An immigration detainer asks for a few extra days of detention. This gives
ICE agents time to get to the jail and take custody after the normal release date.
The detainer form asks the recipient to maintain custody for an extra forty-
eight hours, not including weekends and holidays.'I Detainers were never a ma-
jor immigration enforcement tool before the ramp-up of criminal-law-based
interior enforcement. But starting in 2007, detainer use proliferated. Having is-
sued fewer than i,ooo per month, without exception, until the start of 20o6, ICE
was issuing more than io,ooo every month by the end of 2007, and over 25,000
per month by 2011.16 The detainer had become the primary mode of interior en-
forcement.
82. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
83. Guillermo Cantor, Mark Noferi & Daniel E. Martinez, Enforcement Overdrive: A
Comprehensive Assessment of ICE's Criminal Alien Program, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL
1 & n.i (NOV. 2015), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/research/enforcement overdrive_a_comprehensive assessment of ices
_criminal-alien-program final.pdf [http://perma.cc/PA9A-9JXB].
84. See supra note 47.
85. See Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC. (Dec.
2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-
form.pdf [http://perma.cc/5D5W-BQES].
86. Further Decrease in ICE Detainer Use: Still Not Targeting Serious Criminals,
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Aug. 28, 2015), http://trac.syr
.edu/immigration/reports/402/ [http://perma.cc/PQ2U-WJ5U].
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Figure 2: Detainers Issued per Month
Removals escalated as a result. The annual rate climbed above 400,000 in
2012 and 2013.87 This was double the rate of a decade earlier, and nearly twenty
times the roughly 20,ooo-per-year of the 1980s.8 By 2013, interior enforcement
had taken off, and subfederal governments were its primary facilitators. In the
decade prior, the federal government had invited subfederal entities to partici-
pate, but to do so, their individual law enforcement officers still needed to act
affirmatively, by gathering information and transmitting it to immigration offi-
cials.9 Now, with Secure Communities, the expansion of the Criminal Alien
Program, and the proliferation of detainers, local officers did not have to do
much, or at least they did not have to make their own decisions; they just had to
follow federal instructions.90
87. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 37, at 103 tbl.39 .
88. Id.
89. Many did. The number of LESC inquiries skyrocketed during the 2000s. See U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf't, Law Enforcement Support Center, U.S. DEP'T
HOMELAND SEC. (2007), http://services.dlas.virginia.gov/user-db/frmvscc.aspx?
viewid=145 [http://perma.cc/BT4V-ADEP].
90. This is an important difference, because the sheer complexity of immigration law
makes it perilous even for lawyers to interact with it. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 387 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (calling immigration law a "complex
specialty that generally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney's ex-
pertise"); id. at 377-85 (detailing that complexity).
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Figure 3: Removals Since IRCA
This is when the present tension began to take root. Many localities already
had non-enforcement policies from the 198os or the early 2000S, which prohib-
ited police from investigating or reporting immigration status, but none of
those policies spoke to detainers9 1-which, barely existed before 2007. The first
anti-detainer and anti-notification policies were adopted in 2011 by Santa Clara
County, California9 2 and Cook County, Illinois.93 Both ordinances prohibited
compliance with any detainers unless DHS paid for the extra detention costs,
something DHS does not do.94 The ordinances also blocked ICE agents from
interrogating inmates in the local jails. In 2012, the Connecticut Department of
Corrections and several cities enacted similar policies.95
91. See Pham, supra note 18, at 1383 & n.44 (describing illustrative sanctuary policies
from the first two waves).
92. Santa Clara County, Cal., Ordinance 3.54(3), Civil Immigration Detainer Requests
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/santa-clara
_ordinance.pdf [http://perma.cc/H868-V3TP].
93. Cook County, Ill., Ordinance § 46-37, Policy for Responding to ICE Detainers
(Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/07-cook-county
_ordinance.pdf [http://perma.cc/JBH9-3PPN].
94. See Letter from David Venturella, Assistant Dir., Immigration & Customs Enf't, to
Miguel MArquez, Cty. Counsel, Santa Clara Cty. (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www
.scribd.com/doc/38550589/ICE-Letter-Responding-to-SCC-Re-S-Comm-9-28-1o
[http://perma.cc/Z6LZ-GMXV].
95. See, e.g., Administrative Directive: Inmate Admissions, Transfers and Discharges,
CONN. DEP'T CORR. 9-10 (2012), http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ado9O3
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Even so, removals kept rising. They hit a record high of 438,ooo in 2013, as
the Obama Administration neared its two millionth overall. 6 In late 2013, Cali-
fornia passed the first statewide anti-detainer law. The statute prohibited com-
pliance with detainer requests unless the subject had a certain criminal record.97
Connecticut soon followed suit.9' The pace of new anti-detainer policies in-
creased dramatically in early 2014, after a district court in Oregon held a county
liable for damages under the Fourth Amendment, for honoring a detainer is-
sued without probable cause.99 In short order, dozens of cities and counties
around the country announced anti-detainer policies.' By mid-2014, about
.pdf [http://perma.cc/XB96-3D2A]; COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 19-585, IMMIGRATION DETAINER
COMPLIANCE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2012, at 16 (2012), http://dcclimsi.dccouncil
.us/images/ooool/20120604161227.pdf [http://perma.cc/APW6-CXLB]; N.Y.C.,
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 1, § 9-131, Persons Not To Be Detained (2016).
For clarity, I will use "anti-detainer," "anti-notification," "anti-reporting,"
and "anti-inquiry" to describe the specific actions that different policies limit.
Other terms-especially "sanctuary policy"-do not distinguish between these
distinct forms of non-cooperation. Neither does the difference between "don't
ask" and "don't tell" policies, because "don't tell" could mean either "don't af-
firmatively report" or "don't answer when asked." A number of jurisdictions have
the former policy; only a few have the latter.
96. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants
Reach Record High in 2013, PEw RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2ol4/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-
2013/ [http://perma.cc/D9ZF-4U4L].
97. Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools (TRUST) Act, 2013 Cal. Stat.
4650 (codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 7282-7282.5 (2016)); see Recent Legislation,
California Limits Local Entities' Compliance with Immigration and Customs En-
forcement Detainer Requests, 127 HARv. L. REV. 2593, 2595 (2014) (listing the excep-
tions).
98. Act Concerning Civil Immigration Detainers, 2013 Conn. Acts 13-155 (Reg. Sess.),
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/2013PA-00155-RooHB-o6659-PA.htm [http://
perma.cc/JZ4E-NBAA].
99. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D.
Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
oo. See, e.g., John Fritze, O'Malley Tightens Rules on Federal Immigration Requests,
BALT. SUN (Aug. 29, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-29/news/bs-
md-omalley-immigration-policy-20140829__governor-o-malley-detainers-
immigrants [http://permacc/59NC-6W8U]; Letter from Lincoln D. Chafee, Gov-
ernor, R.I., to Ashbel T. Wall, II, Dir., R.I. Dep't of Corr. (July 17, 2014), http://
www.ilrc.org/files/documents/rhode-island doc.pdf [http://perma.cc/FUF9-
MT2T]; Julia Preston, Sheriffs Limit Detention of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19 /us/politics/sheriffs-limit-detention-of-
immigrants.html [http://perma.cc/UKS4-J5X5]; Ali Winston, Alameda County
Sheriffs Ends Detention Holds of Undocumented Immigrants, EAST BAY ExPRESS
(May 21, 2014), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2014/os/21/
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300 states, counties, cities, and law enforcement agencies had adopted policies
limiting their cooperation with detainers, and sometimes notification requests
as well."o'
Like their predecessors, this third generation of non-cooperation policies
has been motivated by a mix of substantive and procedural factors. Some juris-
dictions have challenged federal policy on the merits, objecting to both the level
and distribution of enforcement. Most have objected to the attendant financial
cost, litigation risk, and harm to community policing."o2 Unlike their predeces-
sors, these anti-detainer and anti-notification policies have had a major impact
on federal enforcement capacity,'03 because of the intervening decades' shift to
interior enforcement that relies on local police.
They quickly influenced DHS's own policies as well. In November 2014, re-
sponding to the widespread opposition, DHS announced two initiatives. The
first was a large deferred action program, for which several million unauthor-
ized immigrants would have been eligible.10 4 This program, however, was
quickly enjoined nationwide by a district court in Texas. The Fifth Circuit up-
held the injunction, and the Supreme Court split 4-4, leaving the injunction in
place for the foreseeable future.'o The other initiative was a new enforcement-
alameda-county-sheriff-ends-detention-holds-of-undocumented-immigrants
[http://perma.cc/SJ3P-5Q6G].
io. There is some uncertainty about exactly how many jurisdictions have anti-detainer
policies. Compare Amy Taxin, LA, Others Let Immigration Agents in the Jails, Rules
Vary, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 28, 2015, 6:22 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/32718a5 57ffb 41efa4314c32828ef05c/la-others-let-immigration-agents-jails-rules-
vary [http://perma.cc/DR6N-APGA] ("roughly 340 jurisdictions"), with States and
Localities That Limit Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR.
NETWORK (NOV. 2014), http://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/anti-detainer
policies_11_21_14.pdf [http://perma.cc/4KKV-9W8R] ("three states, the District
of Columbia, and at least 293 localities"). For a list of anti-detainer policies, and
links to the documents, see Detainer Policies, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR.,
http://www.ilrc.org/resources/detainer-policies [http://perma.cc/Q2NT-5F8Y].
102. Others have explained these motivations in greater detail. See, e.g., Ming Hsu
Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cit-
ies After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 26-35 (2016).
103. See LAW ENF'T SYS. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DECLINED DETAINER
OUTCOME REPORT (Oct. 8, 2014), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/Declined
%2odetainers%2oreport-o.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GBK-HCMA]; see also Further
Decrease in ICE Detainer Use, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Aug.
28, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/4o2/ [http://perma.cc/R5U7-
CHCZ].
104. Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Policies
for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_H120_memo
prosecutorial discretion.pdf [http://perma.cc/UU3G-ST3D].
105. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), affd, 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015), affd by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (Mem.).
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priorities memorandum, called the Priority Enforcement Program.'6 This pro-
gram responds to both procedural and substantive objections, by favoring noti-
fication requests over detainers, and by requiring line-level agents to obtain su-
pervisory approval before taking action against immigrants who fall outside
defined enforcement priorities.10 7 That said, Secure Communities' main activi-
ty-fingerprint sharing across databases-is continuing. It remains too early to
tell what effect the Priority Enforcement Program will have. ICE has been issu-
ing fewer detainers, but the distribution has not changed much."o0
Controversy arose again in mid-2015 after the San Francisco pier killing. In
its aftermath, some jurisdictions tempered their non-cooperation policies.109
Critics, both inside and outside of Congress, began formulating ways to induce
recalcitrant governments to reenter the system. Two constellations of proposals
soon emerged. One would mandate compliance with notification requests.no
The other would cut off federal funds-starting with SCAAP, but progressing
through a wide range of law-enforcement and local-government grants-to ju-
risdictions with anti-detainer, anti-notification, and/or anti-reporting poli-
cies."' In early 2016, the House Appropriations Committee began to pressure
the Department of Justice to enforce § 1373 through litigation."2 That summer,
the Department of Justice announced that it would deny certain law enforce-
ment grants to jurisdictions that violated § 1373.1n And since the 2016 presiden-
106. See Johnson, supra note 104.
107. Id. at 5.
108. See Further Decrease in ICE Detainer Use, supra note 103 (reporting that in April
2015, 68% of detainers still targeted people with no criminal convictions).
109. E.g., Kate Linthicum, Immigration Agents Allowed Back in L.A. County Jails, with
Limits, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-
ice-los-angeles-jails-20150922-story.html [http://perma.cc/Z2W8-EKAV]. But see




no. See Press Release, Senator Diane Feinstein, Feinstein Statement on Sanctuary Cit-




In. See, e.g., Stop Sanctuary Policies and Protect America Act, S. 2146, 114th Cong.
(2015); Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 3009, u4 th Cong. (as passed
by House on July 23, 2015). For other currently pending bills, see Pending Legisla-
tion, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. Ass'N, http://www.aila.org/advo-media/whats-happening-
in-congress/pending-legislation [http://perma.cc/JCTS-C2NG].
112. See Letter from Representative John A. Culberson, to Loretta Lynch, Att'y Gen.
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://culberson.house.gov/uploadedfiles/culbersonletterto
.attorney-general-lynch.pdf [http://perma.cc/6LRB-7NH7].
113. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Representative John A.
Culberson (July 7, 2016), http://culberson.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2o16-7-7-
section_1373_-_dojetterto culberson.pdf [http://perma.cc/MC2N-R3K5]
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tial election, threats have emerged to withhold "all" funding from jurisdictions
with non-cooperation policies.114
B. The Basic Approaches
As the last Part showed, over the past thirty years, interior immigration en-
forcement has become something of an adjunct to state criminal justice sys-
tems. To maintain that link, a variety of methods have been used or proposed.
These methods occupy a rough continuum of pressure, from simple solicitation
to hard mandate. In this Section, I will identify their basic forms and broader
patterns."' Parts III, IV, and V will then assess their constitutional, theoretical,
and normative dimensions.
1. Asks
The most basic way to enlist state and local support has been to simply ask
for it. In the years after 9/11, during the first big push for local enforcement,
DHS officials personally asked local governments and law enforcement agencies
to investigate, report, arrest, and detain on behalf of the federal government."'
The inducement strategy here was persuasion: federal officials trying to con-
vince state officials that helping enforce immigration law was the right thing to
do. More recently, local officials are reporting a renewed regimen of direct per-
suasion from immigration officials.117
("[Tihe Department[] [of Justice] Office of Justice Programs ... has determined
that Section 1373 is an applicable federal law for the purposes of JAG and
SCAAP."). It appears that no action has yet been taken to cut off any funding, per-
haps because the demand for compliance with § 1373 only applies prospectively,
starting with fiscal year 2017 funds. See Office of Justice Programs, Additional
Guidance Regarding Compliance with 8 U.S.C § 1373, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 1 (Oct. 6,
2016), http://www.bja.gov/funding/Additional-BJA-Guidance-on-Section-1373-
October-6-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3KN-EAFH] ("No FY 2016 or prior year
Byrne/JAG or SCAAP funding will be impacted.").
114. See, e.g., Maria Sacchetti & Meghan E. Irons, State's "Sanctuary Cities" Risk Losing
Federal Funds Under Trump, Bos. GLOBE (Nov. 15, 2016), http://
www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/H/14/state-sanctuary-cities-risk-losing-federal
-funds/FdQaxUqoSsxFIVVSVr6zml/story.html [http://perma.cc/SB2T-9EDF];
Julia Terruso, Kenney: Philadelphia To Remain a Sanctuary City-For Now, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/heardinthehall/
Kenney-Philadelphia-will-stay-sanctuary-city-for-now.html [http://perma.cc/
NM9M-S5TW] ("Trump has said he would go even farther, pulling all federal
funding from sanctuary cities.").
115. For a related project, which categorizes the effect of presidential action on sub-
federal lawmaking, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The
President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101 (2016).
u6. See supra note 59.
117. See, e.g., Matza, supra note lo9 ("[Philadelphia Mayor] Kenney said [DHS Secre-
tary] Johnson will send ICE representatives to Philadelphia to brief immigration
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In most places, this approach has been perfectly effective."' Many local
governments, of course, want to help enforce immigration law. These jurisdic-
tions don't need any inducement at all. In practice, the same has often been true
in places where participating in immigration enforcement did not yet have
much political valence; those agencies would grant notification and detainer re-
quests as a matter of course, just as they would cooperate with any other law en-
forcement agency. The rest of the inducement strategies have been for places
where officials have been skeptical, or at least ambivalent, about helping to en-
force the immigration laws.
2. Offers
To enable (and thus encourage) voluntary cooperation, the federal gov-
ernment has made certain resources available to local law enforcement, with lit-
tle commitment attached to their acceptance. One example is the creation of the
LESC hotline in 1994. Another is the expansion of the NCIC database in 2001.
By giving police officers and sheriffs' deputies easy access to immigration status
information, the INS lowered a barrier to entry for those who were so inclined.
So did the 2002 OLC Memorandum, which purported to give legal cover for
voluntary participation. Many local-enforcement bills have tried to codify this
authority in statutory law."9 Another example is the 287(g) program, which
provides federal training and arrest authority to local police who want to take a
more active role. Local agencies who participate are free to limit their involve-
ment; they assume no obligations beyond compliance with federal supervi-
sion. 120 The original design of Secure Communities also took the form of an of-
stakeholders on the new [Priority Enforcement] [P]rogram and try to explain why
it does not have the shortcomings of Secure Communities."); Pham, supra note 18,
at 1386 (describing early 2000S solicitation); Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1087 (same);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2015
Statistics (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/12/22/dhs-releases-end-
fiscal-year-2015-statistics [http://perma.cc/R9K3-EKNB] ("Throughout 2015, DHS
and ICE conducted a nationwide effort to implement PEP and promote collabora-
tion, reaching out to thousands of local law enforcement agencies and government
officials. The agency's Field Office Directors have briefed the program to over
2,000 law enforcement jurisdictions.").
118. While a handful of states and several hundred cities and counties have enacted
non-cooperation policies, the majority have not. See supra note 16.
1g. See, e.g., Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR Act),
H.R. 2671, lo8th Cong. § 101 (2003) ("[L]aw enforcement personnel of a State or a
political subdivision of a State are fully authorized to investigate, apprehend, de-
tain, or remove aliens in the United States.").
120. The 287(g) program could technically be considered a form of conditional non-
preemption, because it allows local police to act in an otherwise preempted field.
See infra Section II.A (discussing conditional non-preemption). But because the
baseline, after Arizona v. United States, seems to be that states lack independent
authority for civil immigration arrests, see 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505-07 (2012), I think
the program is better characterized as a new offer of authority that otherwise does
112
35 :87 2016
THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE NEW COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
fer. If states wanted, the federal government would run their fingerprints
through immigration databases."' By signing up, states took on no new obliga-
tions.
3. Trades
Moving along the pressure continuum, the federal government has at times
traded money or services for discrete pieces of enforcement assistance. The
eventual "mandatory" form of Secure Communities is a prominent example.
The FBI provides the service of maintaining a central criminal-justice database
and responding to inquiries; in return, it forwards biometric data to DHS for
immigration enforcement purposes. The FBI's service is apparently so valuable
that even when DHS switched Secure Communities from an opt-in to an opt-
out program, angering many state governments, not a single jurisdiction opted
out.
Another potential trade is for money. For instance, many of the recent in-
ducement proposals would condition SCAAP funding on responding to detain-
er and notification requests.m' That would enact a classic Spending Clause
trade: the federal government helps pay for the detention, but in exchange re-
tains the option to extend it and know when it ends.2 3 Another seemingly obvi-
ous trade is one that, curiously, has not been proposed so far: paying states and
localities the cost of their help. The one time a county publicly asked if DHS
would reimburse its detention costs and indemnify possible litigation costs, the
agency declined.124
not exist. See also Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State
Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 19-34 (2013)
(arguing that Arizona rejected inherent authority). Conditional non-preemption,
in contrast, tends to impose federal conditions on "continued" state activity in a
preemptible (but not yet preempted) field-a characterization that simply does
not fit this context.
121. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (describing the Secure Communities
rollout).
122. See supra note iii.
123. This is not the case for every detainer or notification request, because SCAAP
funds only cover unauthorized immigrants with past crimes held for at least four
consecutive days. See Office of Justice Programs, SCAAP Program Description, U.S.
DEP'T JUST. 1, http://ojp.gov/about/pdfs/BJASCAAP%2oProg%2oSummary
For%2oFY%2017%2oPresBud.pdf [http://perma.cc/MF8W-ZDUG].
124. Letter from David Venturella, supra note 94; cf Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 817 (1998) (arguing that "the federal
government should purchase [subfederal] services through a voluntary intergov-
ernmental agreement").
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4. Threats
Other Spending Clause proposals look more like threats, because they
would terminate arguably separate programs as punishment for anti-detainer or
anti-notification policies."' As Section III.C will explain, the line between trade
and threat is a bit fuzzy, because it implicates the underdeveloped doctrinal dis-
tinction between spending conditions that direct the use of funds, and condi-
tions that leverage an old program to induce the acceptance of a new one. But
some conditions are surely more threatening than others. In this case, those in-
clude proposals to cut off various sources of law enforcement and general local
government funding."' These inducements apply more pressure than offers or
trades, because they do not offer new resources, they simply threaten punish-
ment. 7
5. Prohibitions
Hard prohibitions go a step further. The 1996 statutes banning certain anti-
notification and anti-reporting policies do not mandate any affirmative activity,
but they do purport to stop certain state actors from restricting their subordi-
nates' participation. Under those laws, no government entity or official can
"prohibit, or in any way restrict" another entity or official's exchange of infor-
mation with federal officials."' This limits both the statutes that state legisla-
tures can enact and the departmental policies that sheriffs and police chiefs can
adopt. While the laws do not require the sharing of information, they remove
options for preventing it.`9 Another prohibition example is 8 C.F.R. § 236.6,
125. The SCAAP cut-offs arguably do this, because that program mostly pays for ordi-
nary criminal-law detention. On that theory, the threats in the local-enforcement
bills flip SCAAP from an offer to a threat. My thanks to Cody Wofsy for pointing
this out.
126. See infra Section III.C.i (describing the threatened programs).
127. There is a theoretical literature about whether "offers," "trades," and "threats" are
analytically separable. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE,
AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440, 447-53 (Sidney Mor-
genbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton White eds., 1969); Mitchell N. Berman, Com-
pulsion, Coercion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1296-97 (2013). I will leave that debate to
the side, because my goal here is just to offer some basic heuristics about the
amount of pressure different inducements apply, and surely terminating a separate
and unrelated program applies more pressure than giving new money or authority
with no strings attached. I do not suggest that these categories are legally disposi-
tive.
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which blocks public disclosure of information about immigration detainees,
preempting state open records laws.'30
6. Mandates
Finally, outright mandates occupy the furthest end of the spectrum. A 2015
proposal by Senator Diane Feinstein would simply mandate certain infor-
mation-sharing."' This would displace all anti-notification policies by requiring
state and local officials to notify ICE, upon request, of the date on which an in-
dividual is scheduled for release. This is the only inducement approach that
would impose affirmative duties on state and local governments, with no possi-
bility for opting out. It was to be introduced as an amendment o another local-
enforcement bill in the Senate Judiciary Committee, but that bill eventually
skirted the committee amendment process.'
C. The Broader Dynamics
These different kinds of pressure have not, in practice, been sealed off from
one another. This Section identifies some broader patterns of federal behavior
and connections between different inducement categories. Two recurring
themes stand out.
First, across multiple inducement strategies, the tendency has been to place
downward pressure on state discretion. In their chosen counterparties, Con-
gress and DHS have preferred localities over states, law enforcement over legis-
latures, and employees over leadership. Of course, any time the federal govern-
ment works with the states, it chooses which actors to interact with, and thus
which to empower.133 But in the immigration context, it has been notable how
consciously and consistently federal actors have chosen to deal with increasingly
lower levels of the state law-enforcement hierarchy. Secure Communities, orig-
inally conceived as a federal-state program,13 4 was quickly recast as a primarily
federal-local initiative. Detainers and notification requests were sent directly to
local staff, without even seeking the local government's permission. The 287(g)
program partners directly with local agencies, without seeking state or local in-
put. The proposed funding cut-offs similarly target grants that go either to local
governments or directly to local agencies. Most importantly, § 1373 enshrines
130. 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2016) ("No person, including any state or local government enti-
ty ... [that] holds any detainee on behalf of the [INS] ... shall disclose or other-
wise permit to be made public the name of, or other information relating to, such
detainee.").
131. See Press Release, supra note 11o.
132. See Seung Min Kim, GOP Punts on "Sanctuary Cities" Bill, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2015,
4:23 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/o9/sanctuary-cities-senate
-republicans-bill-213652 [http://perma.cc/HH4V-9Z3P].
133. See Fahey, supra note 19 (charting this dynamic in the context of cooperative
spending programs).
134. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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this downward pressure in law. By protecting the right of "any . .. official" to
share immigration status information, the statute devolves discretion not just
from state to local government, not just from local government to local law en-
forcement, but from law-enforcement policymakers to line-level police.'
Downward pressure has ensured fairly broad participation. While a num-
ber of states resisted Secure Communities from the outset,16 few localities did,
at least initially. Law enforcement agencies, for their part, are used to cooperat-
ing with each other as a matter of course. When detainers first came pouring in,
starting in 2007, local jails largely honored them, with little fanfare. Now that
there has been some pushback, each locality has had to decide whether and how
much to participate. The result is a patchwork landscape, with federal capabili-
ties varying from one county to the next.'37 Even where state laws have re-
centralized some of these decisions, they have left local communities with many
residual implementation choices. ]38
The second pattern, while closely tied to the first, is not as easy to catego-
rize. It operates less in the realm of law and more in the realm of manners. By
sending discretion downward, the federal government has not only found itself
more sympathetic counterparts, it has found ones less prone to resistance.
Compared to states, localities have smaller budgets, more constrained authori-
ty, and thinner litigation resources. Many have therefore lacked the political
clout, financial security, and legal resolve to resist federal pressure, even when
they had concerns about participating.39 These imbalances are even more pro-
nounced for their line employees.
This dynamic had a real effect in the early years of detainers. Across the
country, law enforcement officials professed to consider them mandatory.4 o Of
course, the federal government could never actually force local governments to
initiate or extend a detention-that would plainly violate the anti-
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters:
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal
Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 (2011) (explaining how devolution shifts gatekeeping
power to local officers).
136. See supra note 76.
137. See supra note 16; see also infra Section V.A (discussing disuniformity).
138. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7282.5(a) (2016) (allowing "local law" or "local policy" to
impose further restrictions on detainer compliance).
139. There are, of course, prominent exceptions. The first places to resist the flood of
detainers issued under Secure Communities were Santa Clara County, California
and Cook County, Illinois.
140. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. io-cv-o6815, 2012 WL 1080020 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
2012) (holding that detainers were mandatory), vacated, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014);
Julian Aguilar, Immigration at Forefront in Travis County Sheriff Race, TEX. TRIB.
(May 7, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/2012/05/o7/immigration-forefront-
travis-county-sheriff-race/ [http://perma.cc/KBD5-M4QR]; Cindy Chang, Sheriff
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commandeering rule.'4' But local officials were not sure, and the consequences
for violating a federal mandate-a lawsuit, loss of federal funding-were poten-
tially severe. This uncertainty would last until state attorneys general, and then
federal courts, started prominently declaring that jails were constitutionally free
to decline the requests.142
DHS played its part in this confusion. For many years, the language of the
detainer form suggested that it might be mandatory. It stated: "[t]his request
flows from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, which provides that a law en-
forcement agency 'shall maintain custody of an alien' once a detainer has been
issued by DHS. You are not authorized to hold the subject beyond these 48
hours."43 Even after a host of sheriffs made clear that they understood this to be
a command, the agency largely declined to correct the record.144 Nor did it en-
gage directly with policymakers. Instead, it continued sending an anonymous
stream of detainer and notification requests directly to jail employees. This was
a softer version of § 1373's downward pressure, but its effect was the same. It
loosely resembled the agency's shifting stance on whether Secure Communities
was an opt-in or an opt-out program. In both cases, DHS, whether inadvertent-
141. See infra Section II.B.
142. E.g., Galarza, 745 F.3d at 644-45 (holding that detainers were requests that locali-
ties could refuse); Letter from Douglas F. Gansler, Att'y Gen., State of Md. to
Senator Victor R. Ramirez (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/document/
329 650219 /10-31-13-Letter-from-MD-Att-y-Gen-to-Sen-Ramirez-on-Immigration-
Detainers [http://perma.cc/Q4ZV-7TNG] (same); Information Bulletin: Responsibil-
ities of Local Law Enforcement Agencies Under Secure Communities and the TRUST
Act, CAL. DEP'T JUST. 2 (Dec. 4, 2012), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs
/lawenforcement/14-01le-info bulletin.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZJ97-966A] (same).
143. Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC. (2013), http://
www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZL2E-K2FN]. This sentence produced a great deal of conflict and
merits a closer look. The regulation it quotes states, "[u]pon a determination by
the Department to issue a detainer ... , such agency shall maintain custody of the
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours." 8 C.F.R. § 287 .7(d) (2016). This lan-
guage could either be a (clearly unconstitutional) command or a (clearly constitu-
tional) limit, respectively: (1) you must maintain custody, but not for more than 48
hours, or (2) you may maintain custody, but if you do, it must not last longer than
48 hours. And yet the detainer form cuts off the quote before getting to the limit,
thus associating the regulation only with the command; the limit comes in a sepa-
rate sentence.
144. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4269o, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS:
LEGAL ISSUES 12-13 (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R4269o.pdf [http://
perma.ccl769R-EEK4] (describing confusion based on the form). DHS did con-
cede that they were non-mandatory in litigation. E.g., Defendants' Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings at *9, Moreno v. Na-
politano, 2016 WL 5720465 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2013) (No. 1:11-cv-05452).
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ly or on purpose, obscured the nature of the choices being offered to state and
local governments.1
So if the first dynamic has been downward pressure on state discretion, the
second has been a selective candor about he states' range of options. In late
2014, a countervailing dynamic showed signs of emerging. In response to the
latest wave of state and local resistance, DHS modulated its policies-at least
ostensibly-to address some of the concerns subfederal governments were rais-
ing. After the 2016 election, however, the pendulum has swung back to confron-
tation. To better understand these approaches to inducement, the next Part lays
out the existing constitutional doctrine that governs federal attempts to shape
state behavior.
II. INDUCEMENT IN LEGAL CONTEXT: THE "RIGHT OF REFUSAL"
There are many ways the federal government can implement policy over
and through the states. To put the inducement continuum in legal context, this
Part surveys the various constitutional "rules of engagement,146 and then pro-
poses a new principle that ties together the primary limits on federal power: the
"right of refusal." Most simply stated, the right of refusal bars inducement strat-
egies that deny states a meaningful option to withhold their regulatory assis-
tance. The principle is narrow, in that it does not disturb the background rules
of engagement announced in the 198os: that Congress may induce through of-
fers, trades, and even some threats, and it can directly regulate state govern-
ments just as it regulates private entities. But the principle is also adaptable, in
that it bars all forms of threat, prohibition, and mandate that effectively force
states to help regulate. This principle simultaneously reconciles the cooperative
federalism cases of the last three decades, aligns their normative justifications,
and generates insights about their future application.
A. Background Rules of Engagement
Before getting to the commandeering and coercion limits, it is important to
appreciate the baseline regime over which they were drawn. In the decade be-
fore New York v. United States-when it started striking down statutes on feder-
alism grounds-the Supreme Court approved some basic methods by which the
federal government can regulate state governments and encourage them to help
implement federal law. Four principles are most relevant for understanding
modern inducement strategies.
145. Accord Chen, supra note 102, at 23-25 (describing the same dynamic); Lasch, supra
note 18, at 698 ("There has been considerable debate and confusion over whether
immigration detainers act as a federal request or as a command to state or local of-
ficials.").
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1. Regulating States
Congress can impose generally applicable regulations on state and local
governments. In 1985, the Supreme Court held in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority that Congress could extend the Fair Labor Standard
Act's minimum wage and overtime provisions to state and local employees.'14
Note that this meant upholding a federal command to state governments: pay
employees a minimum wage and overtime. That command, however, only re-
quired states, as employers, to do what all other employers had to do. It did not
require them to use their regulatory authority in any particular way.
Garcia's rule, if not its rationales,'" has largely survived the federalism re-
vival of the last two and a half decades. In the first "new federalism" cases of the
early 199os, the Court reaffirmed Garcia's basic holding, albeit begrudgingly.'49
Even after all the new limits of the 199os, it has continued to uphold generally
applicable federal regulation of state activities, with no concern for whether
those activities are traditional, integral to state sovereignty, or anything else.'
147. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). A decade earlier, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the
Court had struck down that extension, explaining that the regulation impermissi-
bly "displace[d] the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions." 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). National League of
Cities had, in turn, overruled the Court's contrary decisions a decade earlier in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
In Garcia, a 5-4 majority overruled that decision for two primary reasons.
First, the distinction between traditional and non-traditional government func-
tions had proved overly subjective and generally unworkable. 469 U.S. at 539-45;
id. at 548 (recognizing "the elusiveness of objective criteria for 'fundamental' ele-
ments of state sovereignty"); see also New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-
84 (1946) (abandoning a governmental/proprietary distinction in the context of
intergovernmental tax immunity for similar subjectivity reasons). Second, and
much more broadly, the Court articulated a new approach to judicial review of
federalism: that the Constitution was designed to protect state autonomy through
the political process, not the courts. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51.
148. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court announced a clear statement rule for federal stat-
utes regulating state decisions "of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign enti-
ty." 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). In dissent, Justice Blackmun-Garcia's author-
protested that this contravened Garcia's reliance on political safeguards and rejec-
tion of attempts to identify particularly important areas of state governance. See id.
at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 464 ("We are constrained in our ability to consider the limits that the
state-federal balance places on Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause."
(citing Garcia, 469 U.S. 528)); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
150. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
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2. Conditional Offers
Congress can trade things within its power-like money, or regulatory au-
thority, or forbearance from preemption-for state assistance that would oth-
erwise lie beyond its reach. In a conditional spending program, Congress offers
money to states or localities, but only if they comply with certain conditions.
The 1987 case South Dakota v. Dole confirmed that those conditions can reach
subject matter beyond Congress' enumerated powers.'"' Congress can similarly
impose conditions on a state's continued regulation in a field that federal law
could fully occupy (this is frequently called "conditional non-preemption").'5 2
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, the Court upheld a
challenge to federal mining regulations that state regulators had to enforce in
order to stay in business."3 It explained that "Congress could constitutionally
have enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining,"
but instead "chose to allow the States a regulatory role."154 The Court upheld an
even more intrusive version the following year in FERC v. Mississippi.55 Both
spending and non-preemption conditions provide Congress with a powerful
tool to induce assistance that it could otherwise not secure.
3. Regulatory Burdens
Otherwise-valid legislation does not violate, the Tenth Amendment simply
because the states must legislate or expend resources to comply. In both Hodel
and FERC, the Court rejected the notion that the financial cost of compliance
might render a statute unconstitutional.1"6 In South Carolina v. Baker, the Court
extended that principle to laws that required state legislation to achieve compli-
ance.' Congress had effectively banned unregistered bonds, by removing the
151. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
152. But see Hills, supra note 124, at 922-23 (criticizing this equivalency).
153. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
154. Id. at 290.
155. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). A federal statute required state utility regulators to consider
federal standards in setting rates, make certain reports to federal regulators, and
follow certain procedures in adjudicating rate claims. The Court upheld all three,
on the grounds that they were simply conditions placed on the states' continued
activity in a field where Congress could have displaced them altogether. Id. at 765.
The Court was careful to note that its holding did "not suggest that the Federal
Government may impose conditions on state activities in fields that are not pre-
emptible," and that it did "not purport to authorize the imposition of general af-
firmative obligations on the States." Id. at 770 n-32.
156. See id. at 770 n.33; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 292 n.33.
157. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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tax exemption for interest earned on them.''8 To comply with the ban, states
had to enact statutes to provide for issuing registered bonds. The Court was un-
troubled. It explained that the statute "regulates state activities; it does not, as
did the statute in FERC, seek to control or influence the manner in which States
regulate private parties."'9 South Carolina stressed that, to comply with the ban,
"many state legislatures had to amend a substantial number of statutes in order
to issue bonds in registered form," but the Court dismissed that concern as "an
inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity."'
4. Clear Notice
Finally, the boundaries of cooperative programs need to be clearly stated.
For instance, when Congress offers federal funds, the conditions attached to
those funds must be "unambiguous[]."' Likewise, waivers of sovereign im-
munity, as conditions for program participation, must be "unmistakably
clear.""' These clear-statement rules instantiate the political-safeguards ap-
proach of Garcia by ensuring that impositions on state government are the
product of considered federal deliberation, and that states and their constitu-
ents know what they are signing up for. 163
B. The Commandeering Prohibition
The anti-commandeering rule appears straightforward at first blush: the
federal government may not order state officials to enforce a federal regulatory
program. But beneath its flat veneer lies some texture. For one thing, the federal
government can order some state officials to enforce some federal regulatory
programs. Congress can require state and local governments to pay their em-
ployees a minimum wage and overtime. It can require states to affirmatively re-
lease driving records to drivers. It can order some states to affirmatively submit
voting changes to federal preclearance, and it can order state judges to hear fed-
eral causes of action. A closer look is therefore needed.
The basic rule is familiar enough. Congress may not mandate regulatory ac-
tion by state legislatures or law enforcement officers. The Court had first raised
this possibility in FERC and Baker. In the 1992 case New York v. United States,
the Court struck down a provision requiring state legislatures to either provide
158. The statute did not formally ban unregistered bonds, but a Special Master had
concluded-and the Court assumed-that the effect was to ban them completely.
See id. at 511.
159. Id. at 514.
16o. Id.
161. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (requiring that
conditions be stated "unambiguously" to "enable the States to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation").
162. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
163. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991).
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for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, or take title to that waste.164 The
Court explained that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program."'6 Five years later, in Printz v.
United States, the Court struck down a provision of the Brady Handgun Violent
Prevention Act requiring local law enforcement agencies to perform back-
ground checks for gun purchases.'6 It held that the federal government cannot
"command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to ad-
minister or enforce a federal regulatory program."6 7
The Court soon marked an outer limit to its new rule. In Reno v. Condon, it
rejected a challenge to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),"' a
statute that regulated the disclosure of personal information by state DMVs,
sometimes prohibiting disclosure, sometimes requiring it. 69 The Court held
that the statute did not commandeer state officials, because it did not require
state legislatures "to enact any laws or regulations, and it d[id] not require state
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private indi-
viduals."7o It quoted Baker for its distinction between federal statutes that "reg-
ulated state activities," which were permissible, and ones that sought "to control
or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties," which were
not."' The DPPA fell on the former side of that line.
Condon thus turned on the distinction between regulating states and com-
mandeering their own regulatory processes, but it gave little explanation for
where to draw that line. It was not self-evident, for instance, that a regulation of
DMV information-collected from private parties in the state's licensing capac-
ity, and used for a variety of regulatory purposes '7 -did not involve the regula-
tion of private parties. The Court opaquely offered that the DPPA merely
"regulates the States as owners of data bases,"'73 but the same could have been
said of the Brady Act in Printz. Both statutes required state officials to search
state-owned databases and send the results to private parties.74 Instead, the real
164. 505 U.S. 152 (1992) (reviewing the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1985)).
165. Id. at 188.
166. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
167. Id. at 935.
168. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 et seq.
(2012)).
169. 528 U.S. 141, 145 (2000).
170. Id. at 151.
171. Id. at 150 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (alterations
omitted)).
172. See id. at 145 & n.1 (describing the circumstances in which drivers' personal infor-
mation might be used).
173. Id. at 151.
174. This cuts against interpretations that have Condon turning on a "database excep-
tion." See Kittrie, supra note 18, at 1489-90. If the commandeering rule did not ap-
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difference between Condon and Printz, and thus between regulating states and
commandeering them, lies in the next sentence of Condon: the Brady Act re-
quired "state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating
private individuals.""' The DPPA, by contrast, only regulated what state officials
could do with the data in their possession.
Thus, the core question in assessing a federal directive's legality is whether
the enforced statute regulates private parties. The DPPA did not directly regu-
late individuals; the Brady Act did. So understood, the commandeering prohi-
bition is a fairly narrow one. The federal government can compel certain action
by state executives,176 as long as the action does not involve helping to regulate
private parties.'77 There are a few exceptions, but none are relevant for present
purposes.'" The rule leaves untouched the full panoply of regulatory approach-
es the Court blessed in the 198os: conditional spending, conditional non-
preemption, and regulation of states' non-regulatory activities.'79
C. The Coercion Prohibition
Although the Court has not decided a commandeering challenge since
Condon, it applied the same sort of concern for state autonomy in NFIB. The
ply to federal requirements pertaining to a state's use of its databases, then Printz
must have been wrongly decided.
175. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (emphasis added).
176. The federal government still cannot directly compel enactments by legislatures, see
id., though it can effectively do so as incident to complying with mere regulations
of states. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15.
177. The Court recognized a similar distinction in New York, albeit implicitly: "[E]ven
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require
or prohibit those acts." New York v. United States, so5 U.S. 152, 166 (1992).
178. For instance, state judges must hear federal claims that fall within their jurisdic-
tion, and Congress can impose affirmative duties pursuant to its enforcement
power under the Reconstruction Amendments. A third potential exception-
reporting requirements-was explicitly left open in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 917-18 (1997); id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Section III.A, I will ar-
gue that at least some reporting requirements should be understood to comman-
deer.
Finally, many have posited an exception for generally applicable laws. But it
is not clear that this exception actually exists. In Condon, despite finding the DPPA
to be generally applicable, the Court rejected the commandeering challenge for a
different reason: the statute merely regulated the states, as in Baker. If general ap-
plicability cured commandeering, the Court could have just cited Garcia and been
done with it. At any rate, none of my arguments turn on the existence vel non of
such an exception, because the inducement approaches I analyze are not capable
of non-governmental application.
179. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Court
was not cutting off any other inducement options).
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new limits on conditional spending are crucial for assessing Congress's range of
inducement options generally. In immigration specifically, many of the new in-
ducement proposals are spending threats, as in NFIB. But NFIB's doctrine is
hard to parse, both because of its 3-4-2 split, and because the opinions did not
give detailed instructions for future application. This Section lays out what we
know, after NFIB, about Tenth Amendment limits on the Spending Clause.So
Before NFIB, the leading Spending Clause case was South Dakota v. Dole.
Dole involved a statute that conditioned five percent of a state's federal highway
funds-less than half a percent of its overall budget-on the state's enacting a
drinking age of twenty-one."' In upholding the statute, the Supreme Court an-
nounced two rules that are particularly relevant to the current inducement de-
bates. The first is that spending conditions need to be germane to the purpose
of the funds to which they are attached."' The majority declined to "define the
outer bounds of the 'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation," because any such
limitation was satisfied: "the condition imposed by Congress is directly related
to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are expended-safe inter-
state travel.""' Still, that analysis, while terse, provides a significant clue that
germaneness is to be analyzed at a high level of generality. The majority was sat-
isfied that the condition related to a modifier ("safe") that could plausibly at-
tach to the actual purpose of highway funds ("interstate travel"). That sort of
analysis leaves Congress free to impose a broad set of requirements on the activ-
ities it funds. Indeed, in the decades after Dole, lower courts have applied the
germaneness requirement quite deferentially. 184
The second relevant piece of Dole was also hypothetical. The Court reiterat-
ed a possibility it had recognized in the 193s-that "the financial inducement
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure
turns into compulsion."81 But the Court found that the threatened cut-off-
which represented less than one percent of a state's overall budget-only con-
180. Others have undertaken this project in greater detail. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861
(2013); Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power After NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 71 (2014); Berman, supra note 127. 1 will note points of agreement and
difference along the way.
18l. 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987) (describing 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012)).
182. Id. at 207-o8. The majority in Dole did not definitively endorse this requirement,
but at least six Justices in NFIB did. See Nat'l Fed'r of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2634 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 2659 (joint dissent); see also
id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (recounting Dole's germaneness holding).
183. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 & n.3. The Court also concluded that South Dakota had con-
ceded the condition's germaneness. Id.
184. See Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting germane-
ness challenge in SCAAP context); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting
Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a
Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 466-67 & nn.47-49
(2003) (collecting cases).
185. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
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stituted a "relatively mild encouragement," which left states the choice to turn it
down "not merely in theory but in fact.""
Until 2012, the Supreme Court had never invalidated a spending condition
as too coercive. But in NFIB,o it struck down the provision of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) that conditioned all of a state's Medicaid funding on its ac-
ceptance of the statute's expansion of Medicaid. Previously, Medicaid covered
"certain discrete categories of needy individuals-pregnant women, children,
needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled."' The ACA's expansion
covered "all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of
the federal poverty line."'"' Seven Justices voted to strike down' the condition,
but they split between a four-Justice "joint dissent" and a three-Justice opinion
written by Chief Justice Roberts.
The joint dissenters espoused a broad rule. In their view, a big enough of-
fer, even with no threat to previous funds, might be too big for state officials to
refuse, especially with their citizens paying for the program through federal tax-
es. The danger, they said, was that such grants allow Congress to reach into "ar-
eas traditionally governed primarily at the state or local level."'9o Reaching that
area, however, was not necessary to their holding; they would have invalidated
the Medicaid expansion even after acknowledging that healthcare finance is
generally subject to federal regulation.'9' Under the joint dissent's rule, any suf-
ficiently large federal grant could be unconstitutional.
The Chief Justice's opinion was narrower.'92 He relied on two necessary
propositions. First, he viewed the Medicaid expansion as a different program
from prior Medicaid. The condition therefore did not simply change the terms
of eligibility for an existing program; it threatened to cut off existing funds if the
states did not agree to carry out a new one. Had the expansion merely modified
the terms of the existing Medicaid program, the Chief Justice gave every indica-
tion that the statute would have survived.'19 Coercion is therefore only possible
186. Id. at 211-12.
187. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
188. Id. at 2601 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1o) (2012)).
189. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)).
190. Id. at 2662 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.).
191. Id. at 2644 (acknowledging that "purchasing insurance is 'Commerce"' within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause (emphasis in original)).
192. See Bagenstos, supra note 18o, at 867-68, 868 n.24 (calling this "the Court's pivotal
opinion" because it was both narrower than the joint dissent and necessary to
reach a majority).
193. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04. He characterized Dole in similar terms, explaining
that the Court had looked for coercion only because "the condition was not a re-
striction on how highway funds.. . were to be used." Id. at 2604. This distinction
dates back to United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936), in which the Court
pointed out the "difference between a statute stating the conditions upon which
moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractu-
al obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced."
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where a condition does not direct the use of the funds; this much was explicit.
Implicitly, the germaneness requirement does not come into play, either, be-
cause in that situation, the conditions effectively define the funds' purpose. For
instance, in Dole, the funds were "highway funds" because Congress required
them to be spent on highway construction. In other words, there is no case in
which conditions that direct the use of funds could fail a germaneness test, be-
cause the condition is the purpose.
Second, having decided that the condition was meant only to pressure, the
Chief Justice looked at whether the threat, as a percentage of total state budgets,
was coercive. He concluded that "[t]he threatened loss of over io percent of a
State's overall budget ... is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no
real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion."1 94 By contrast, in Dole,
the threatened highway funds had accounted for less than one percent of the
total state budget. The joint dissent also looked to percentages of state budgets,
both on average and in illustrative cases.'95
Together, Dole and NFIB establish a three-step Spending Clause doctrine. If
a condition directs the use of the funds, it is constitutional. If not, then it must
be germane to the purpose of the funds. Even if it is germane, it must still not
be coercive. Comparing Dole and NFIB, a coercive condition threatens some-
where between one and ten percent of the government's total budget. Between
those poles, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have had occasion
to identify a more exact boundary.'''
D. The Right of Refusal
This Section distills a unified principle to fuse the ostensible silos of coop-
erative federalism: the right of refusal. Simply stated, the right of refusal prohib-
its any form of inducement that would meaningfully eliminate a state's ability
to decline to help implement a federal regulatory scheme. The principle is com-
prehensive, in that it reaches forms of regulatory compulsion beyond those at
issue in New York, Printz, and NFIB, but it is narrow, because it is bounded by
the limits of Garcia, Baker, and Condon. In other words, within its small do-
main, the right is absolute.
194. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
195. Id. at 2662-64. In both cases, the Court also noted the threatened percentage of the
program's budget. In Dole, it was 5% of highway funds, id. at 2604; in NFIB, it was
oo% of prior federal Medicaid funds, or 50% to 83% of total state Medicaid ex-
penditures. Id. at 2663. But I doubt that this program-specific percentage can be
independently relevant to the coercion analysis. It neither captures the actual
amount of pressure on state officials (which depends on the size of the program)
nor provides a basis to distinguish the coerciveness of different cut-off threats.
196. See id. at 2606-07 ("It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this
statute is surely beyond it."); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987);
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937) ("We do not fix the outermost
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My goal in this Section is interpretive-to explain how the Court's cases fit
together in a coherent way. '1 But the right of refusal is more than a descriptive
heuristic; it also adds analytic clarity to the cases' normative and doctrinal di-
mensions. This Section is backward-looking: it explores the right of refusal's
role in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. The next Part is prospective: it puts
these claims to the test by applying the right of refusal to some fairly novel-but
potentially pervasive-inducement strategies.
According to NFIB, commandeering and coercion are two sides of the same
coin. As the Chief Justice put it, "[t]he Constitution simply does not give Con-
gress the authority to require the States to regulate.""' Before NFIB, that state-
ment would have only described commandeering. But now, it occurs when
"Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a State to
adopt a federal regulatory system as its own."' 9 The joint dissenters drew on
the same reasoning. After stating the anti-commandeering rule, they explained
that "Congress effectively engages in this impermissible compulsion when state
participation in a federal spending program is coerced, so that the States' choice
whether to enact or administer a federal regulatory program is rendered illuso-
ry."200 According to at least seven Justices, then, commandeering and coercion
are merely variants, formal and functional, on the same principle: states and
their officials must have a meaningful right to refuse participation in federal
programs.20 '
There are indications, moreover, that the right to withhold that participa-
tion is broader than the sum of the anti-coercion and anti-commandeering
doctrines-that is, the federal government may not force the states to help
regulate even if it does so without using direct commands or spending condi-
tions. One indication is that the Court first recognized the possibility of uncon-
197. Others have undertaken related projects to imagine what rights the Tenth
Amendment should protect. See Hills, supra note 124, at 819 ("New York entitle-
ment"); Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 8
(2010) ("entitlement to federal noninterference").
198. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178
(1992)).
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 2660 (joint dissent).
201. Both the Chief Justice and the joint dissent in NFIB repeatedly described their
holdings in terms of the states' right to refuse participation. See id. at 2608 ("States
may now choose to reject the expansion; that is the whole point."); id. at 2603
("[W]e look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting the simple ex-
pedient of not yielding to federal blandishments when they do not want to em-
brace the federal policies as their own." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923))); id. at 2604-05 (recognizing
a state's "'prerogative' to reject Congress's desired policy, 'not merely in theory but
in fact"' (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12)); id. at 2661 (joint dissent) ("[T]he legit-
imacy of attaching conditions to federal grants to the States depends on the volun-
tariness of the States' choice to accept or decline the offered package.").
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stitutional regulatory coercion in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, a case that did
not involve threats to withhold any federal-state funds.2 o2 Another indication is
that, more recently, several Justices raised the possibility of coercion-without-
spending-conditions during the oral argument in King v. Burwell.2 3 The ques-
tion in King was whether the Affordable Care Act allowed subsidies for health
insurance purchasers in states that declined to set up their own exchanges-a
possibility that would have destroyed the healthcare markets in states that re-
fused to help implement the program.2 o4 Justice Kennedy observed that "the
States are being told either create your own Exchange, or we'll send your insur-
ance market into a death spiral," and he called this "a serious constitutional
problem.o"2 s Both Justices who dissented on the coercion issue in NFIB
agreed.206 These inclinations make sense: there are ways the federal government
might take away a state's refusal ability that do not involve commandeering or
spending conditions. The right of refusal I have identified protects states from
any such inducement.
A few things are gained by casting the doctrine in these terms. For one
thing, it aligns many of the justifications for the coercion and commandeering
bans. If it is not a good idea to let the federal government mandate state regula-
tion, then it is probably not a good idea to let it coerce state regulation either.2 07
Pre-NFIB scholarship recognized the coercive potential of spending threats, but
often treated this as an indication of anti-commandeering's incoherence.20
Aligning their core concerns allows us to start evaluating and applying the larg-
202. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The statute in Steward Machine granted a large tax rebate to
companies who paid into state unemployment insurance programs that met feder-
al standards, thus pressuring states to implement such programs. The Court up-
held the program, but suggested that some greater amount of pressure might exert
"a power akin to undue influence," crossing "the point at which pressure turns in-
to compulsion." Id. at 590.
203. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-20, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No.
14-114).
204. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493.
205. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
206. Justice Sotomayor asked "how that is not coercive in an unconstitutional way." Id.
at 15. Justice Ginsburg found it anomalous for a statute to say that if states do not
participate, "then you get these disastrous consequences." Id. at 20.
207. Of course, other normative dimensions of the doctrines might still vary-for in-
stance, their judicial administrability. Even if both commandeering and coercion
are likely to produce the same goods and harms, the former line is far brighter.
208. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspec-
tive, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1629, 1656-57 (2006) ("[T]he Court's general categories dis-
tinguishing permissible from impermissible kinds of federal legislation do not
withstand a functional analysis grounded in the values typically associated with
federalism."); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, in HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2202 (1998) (noting that conditional
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er principle, instead of lamenting its absence. (I take on some of these norma-
tive questions in Part IV.) The right of refusal similarly ties these harder Tenth
Amendment limits to the Court's softer federalism-protecting clear-statement
rules: states cannot meaningfully exercise their right of refusal over grant condi-
tions and sovereign immunity waivers that they do not know about. 209
Recognizing the larger principle also allows us to predict how the induce-
ment jurisprudence might apply in future cases. The most obvious insight is
that some forms of conditional non-preemption are probably invalid after
NFIB.210 If Congress, as a penalty for not administering a federal program,
threatened to kick the states out of a crucial regulatory area, with no federal
fallback, it is hard to see how such a provision would preserve the state's func-
tional right to refuse participation. True, in FERC, the Court brushed aside a
similar scenario." But that was before New York, Printz (which minimized the
coercion at play in FERC),m' and NFIB. Justice Blackmun-who, in Garcia,
foreswore any judicial role in policing federalism-was still the swing vote on
federalism issues. Today's federalism jurisprudence has evolved considerably.
The rule announced in NFIB cuts off one possible circumvention of the com-
mandeering prohibition."' If a future case presented another substitute, there is
no reason to think the Court would not follow the same course.2 14
209. See supra Section II.A. The Chief Justice in NFIB was equally concerned with no-
tice; he insisted at length that when states originally signed up for Medicaid, they
could not have foreseen the ACA's expansion. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebe-
lius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-o6 (2012). Why should that matter? Because it means
states were never given the choice to turn it down.
210. The Court arguably raised this possibility as early as 1999. See Coll. Say. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999) ("In any
event, we think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States'
sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed-
and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to
waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity.").
211. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766-78 (1982).
212. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997).
213. In principle, at least. The broader rule announced in NFIB-that Congress cannot
effectively force state actors to implement federal programs using crippling threats
to separate programs-practically follows from New York. But by acknowledging
that this makes sense in the abstract, I do not mean to endorse the Court's applica-
tion of that principle, in which it held that a large-enough change in Medicaid eli-
gibility somehow created a separate program. It is not clear how courts should
identify this line between eligibility changes and new programs.
214. Professor Roderick Hills argued for a similar rule shortly after Printz, albeit based
on a slightly different rationale. See Hills, supra note 124, at 921-27. The rule he
proposed would protect states from preemption threats whose sole purpose was
leverage; the rule I am imputing to the Court, while cognizant of purpose, would
primarily ask whether the choice to accept preemption is actually available, even if
the condition enacts what Hills argues is a permissible purpose: forcing states to
internalize the cost of harmful behavior.
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The right of refusal similarly illustrates the scope of the commandeering
and coercion rules themselves. If they are a part of the same broader principle,
then it seems fair to apply them-and not apply them-in similar situations.
So, for instance, just as the anti-commandeering rule prohibits both compelled
enactment by state legislatures (like the waste-disposal program in New York)
and compelled enforcement by state executives (like the background checks
Printz), the anti-coercion rule also protects executive enforcement actors, even
though NFIB only addressed legislative enactment.15 Inversely, under the right
of refusal, the coercion ban would only prevent the same limited set of harms as
the commandeering ban: federal laws that co-opt state regulatory processes, not
federal laws that simply regulate the states themselves.2 16 If Congress can direct-
ly impose, say, a minimum wage, it can probably also impose one as a condition
on federal funds or non-preemption.217
One final common thread bears mentioning. In both sets of cases, a num-
ber of Justices revealed a certain preoccupation with congressional purpose,
criticizing federal action whose conscious intent was to force state participation.
In NFIB, the Chief Justice reached the coercion question only after deciding
that the termination threat "serve[d] no purpose other than to force unwilling
States to sign up for the dramatic expansion.""' He cited evidence that Con-
gress "recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program."21 9
The joint dissenters did the same, documenting at length that "Congress well
understood that refusal was not a practical option." 22 0 This echoed the criticism
in Printz that "it is the whole object of the law to direct of the functioning of the
executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sover-
eignty."2 21
To be sure, improper purpose was not exactly a part of the doctrine in either
22case."' But doctrine is often a way to operationalize purposive inquiries. And
215. See infra Section III.C.3 (discussing local coercion).
216. See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
217. See infra note 242; see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59-60 (20o6) ("It is clear that a funding condition cannot be un-
constitutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly.").
218. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (emphasis add-
ed).
219. Id. at 2606.
220. Id. at 2664-65 (joint dissent); see also id. (considering the ACA's "goal"); id. at
2666 ("[I]t is perfectly clear from the goal and structure of the ACA that the offer
of the Medicaid Expansion was one that Congress understood no State could re-
fuse."). Justice Ginsburg noted this preoccupation as well. See id. at 2640 n.25
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The joint dissenters also
rely heavily on Congress' perceived intent to coerce the states.").
221. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
222. Professors Bagenstos and Berman have debated the relevance of purpose in NFIB.
See Bagenstos, supra note 180, at 894-98; Berman, supra note 127, at 1286, 1312
nn.131-32. My position is somewhere in between: I agree with Bagenstos that pur-
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more importantly, these flourishes hint at the underlying concerns of the au-
thoring Justices, who are free to tailor the doctrine accordingly going forward.
In future cases, inducement strategies will be most vulnerable when it looks like
Congress, the President, or a federal agency is consciously trying to suppress the
states' ability to assert their refusal prerogatives.
III. NOVEL INDUCEMENT STRATEGIES AND THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL
Despite the doctrinal convergence heralded by NFIB, the law of cooperative
federalism remains underdeveloped. Immigration enforcement pushes a num-
ber of its boundaries. This Part considers what the emerging right of refusal au-
gurs for the particular inducements that are being tested or proposed in immi-
gration law: mandatory information sharing, prohibitions against certain
sanctuary policies, and local spending threats. Each method has application far
beyond immigration. Anytime the federal government wants information from
the states, it will be easier to demand it. Anytime it seeks help with enforcement,
double-negative or spending-threat inducements will present fast routes to
compliance. The legality of these approaches should therefore be of pressing
concern in many areas of federal law.
A. Mandatory Information Sharing
In response to the resistance of recent years, one proposal would mandate
that state and local officials answer federal notification requests.2 4 Proposed by
Senator Diane Feinstein in the summer of 2015,225 this approach would test a
longstanding uncertainty in commandeering doctrine. In Printz, the majority
reserved the question of whether statutes "which require only the provision of
information to the Federal Government" are constitutional.21 It contrasted
pose is not a part of the doctrine, but I agree with Berman that it appears to be a
core motivation behind many Justices' thinking. The Chief Justice's opinion im-
plicitly approved a purpose to apply pressure, but not a purpose to disable the re-
fusal option altogether.
223. This is well known in the context of fundamental rights, but it can also be true in
structure cases. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 850 (1986) (using multifactor test to ensure that Congress does not act "for the
purpose of emasculating constitutional courts" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
224. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining the use and significance of
notification requests).
225. The proposed mandate would only have applied to immigrants with certain crim-
inal convictions, and would have required probable cause of removability. See
Press Release, supra note 110.
226. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918; see also id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court
appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting
requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its
Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid.").
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those statutes with ones that force the "participation of the States' executive in
the actual administration of a federal program,""7 but made clear that it was
not opining one way or another: "it will be time enough to do so if and when
their validity is challenged in a proper case.""'
In this Section, I argue that this kind of mandate would be hard to square
with the right of refusal the Court now recognizes.2 29 Recall that in Condon, the
Court clarified that the anti-commandeering rule protects against a very specific
type of law: one that requires "state officials to assist in the enforcement of fed-
eral statutes regulating private individuals."o There is little question that a no-
tification mandate is such a law. The immigration laws regulate private individ-
uals, and notification assists in the enforcement of those statutes-in fact, it is
one of the interior enforcement system's two main pillars (the other is the de-
tainer).
One might counter that, while notification might help the federal govern-
ment enforce immigration law, it does not make the state do any enforcing. Af-
ter all, it is the federal government that ultimately takes coercive action against
the individual; the state merely shares a name and a date. Printz answers this
contention. Under the Brady Act, chief law enforcement officers did not have to
actually prevent or prosecute unlawful gun transfers; they were only responsible
for the investigative phase of the program-the background check. So too here.
Forced notification would compel law enforcement to take one of the necessary
steps in the enforcement process. To the regulated individual, this notification
can have the same effect as a new arrest. Thus, in this context, there is not much
daylight inside Printz's distinction between "the provision of information" and
"the actual administration of a federal program."3
In addition to helping implement a statutory scheme that governs individ-
uals, a mandatory reporting duty would place demands on the states' own regu-
latory machinery, the precise harm identified in Baker, New York, and Condon.
Such a mandate would forcibly tap into the states' criminal enforcement pro-
cess, the entirety of which is required to produce the arrest, possible conviction,
and detention that lead to a release date. As I have discussed, this authority to
police for ordinary criminal violations is precisely what makes states' services so
valuable to federal immigration agents. But, as a result, the federal government
could not claim that it is drafting something other than the states' regulatory
processes into service.
227. Id. at 918.
228. Id.
229. For a similar argument, see Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the
Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2012).
23o. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
231. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918; see Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the
Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 235 ("[T]he primary duty imposed by
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Another counter might be that, by the time of release, the states' regulatory
process is over, so the notification mandate does not impose any new burden.232
This objection is wrong for multiple reasons. At the outset, it begs the question
of what actions are "regulatory." It also is not correct that notification is cost-
less. As Professor Robert Mikos has forcefully argued, reporting requirements
can impose high "dynamic costs," meaning that they make future police work
harder, by reducing incentives for immigrant communities to cooperate with
police.233 The testimony of law enforcement officials across three decades bears
out this concern.234 Notification, no less than detainers, can limit state and local
governments' ability to provide basic services to their citizens.
Those dynamics raise some of the same accountability concerns voiced in
Printz. Forced notification may put local governments "in the position of taking
the blame for [the] burdensomeness and . .. defects" of immigration law.235
Even if constituents understand the nature of the federal mandate, local police
are still the ones who may be punished by a loss of community cooperation,
and by the threat of litigation."' In any case, it is not clear that the scope of
harm is even relevant to the Tenth Amendment analysis. Per Printz, even a
"minimal and only temporary burden upon state officers" is impermissible
when "it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state ex-
ecutive."237
To be sure, some forms of reporting might be distinguished as "purely min-
isterial," in the words of Justice O'Connor's Printz concurrence,238 like infor-
mation used for research purposes, or information used to track states' compli-
232. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, No. 07 Cr. 485(HB), 2007 WL 4372829, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007) (rejecting challenge to reporting requirement because "it
merely requires state officials to provide information ... that the state officials will
typically already have through their own state registries" (emphasis added));
Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 697
(D. Md. 2001) (rejecting challenge to reporting requirement on the ground that
"[ilt merely requires the state to forward information to a national data bank that
the state already collects on its own under its own state laws" (emphasis added)),
affd, 313 F-3d 205, 213-14 (4 th Cir. 2002).
233. See Mikos, supra note 229, at 121, 154-64.
234. See Brief for Major Cities Chiefs Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers at 6-in, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-674); supra
notes 32, 63, 102. But see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Legitimacy and Coopera-
tion: Will Immigrants Cooperate with Local Police Who Enforce Federal Immigration
Law? (Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 734, 2015) (reporting null result in
correlation between Secure Communities activation and rate at which serious
crimes are solved).
235. Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.
236. See infra Section IV.D (discussing how immigration enforcement fits into debates
about federalism and accountability).
237. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (2012)).
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ance with valid Garcia- or Baker-type regulations.23 9 The right of refusal does
not protect against those forms of compulsion. But other schemes that demand
information necessary to enforce federal statutes against individuals-like tax or
marijuana laws-would probably fall on the wrong side of that line. If the
Tenth Amendment protects regulatory refusal against all intruders, it is hard to
see why there should be an exception for this form of regulatory mandate.
B. Double-Negative Prohibitions
What about the relatively softer path of prohibition? To recap, in 1996,
IIRIRA provided that a state or local "entity or official may not prohibit, or in
any way restrict, any government entity or official from" sharing immigration-
status information with the federal government.240 This double negative is not
the same as a single positive-it does not mandate any communication; it simp-
ly preserves the ability to communicate. The few scholars and lower courts to
consider these statutes have generally concluded that they comply with the
Tenth Amendment, though their reasoning has varied. 241 After NFIB, however,
this inducement strategy may be on thin ice.
For a double-negative statute like § 1373 to be constitutional, one of two
things must be true. Either the underlying action must be one that Congress
could command or the double-negative form must turn what otherwise was
commandeering into a permissible form of preemption. The first possibility is
less troubling. If Congress can mandate an action, it can probably also preserve
the choice to take that action, which is a less intrusive approach.242 Thus, if
Congress could directly impose mandatory notification, then § 1373 is probably
constitutional. But, as the last Section explained, there are good reasons to
doubt that Congress could impose mandatory notification. The statute's legality
therefore depends on the second possibility.
239. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6051(a), (d) (2012) (requiring states to report employee in-
come to the IRS).
240. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012); see also id. § 1644. Of course, § 1373 may not apply to pol-
icies restricting release-date notification, because release dates are not "infor-
mation regarding the citizenship or immigration status." Id. § 1373(a).
241. Some have relied on the fact that they are prohibitions, not commands. See Pham,
supra note 18, at 1407-08; Rodriguez, supra note 33, at 601 n.147. Others have ar-
gued that "Condon exempts from the anti-commandeering doctrine any ... regu-
lation of states as the owners of databases." Kittrie, supra note 18, at 1497-98, 1501
(arguing that Congress could use the same exception to justify a notification man-
date).
242. To be sure, greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning like this does not always apply in
constitutional analysis. See Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Un-
constitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Less-
er," 55 VAND. L. REv. 693, 710 n.6o (2002). This might be the case when the lesser
regulation imposes distinct harms, the way a ban against advertising an activity
might upset First Amendment values in a way that outright prohibition of that ac-
tivity would not. Here, however, the lesser regulation does not impose any harms
distinct from the greater one.
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There are at least three problems with the idea that the double-negative
form cures any commandeering problem-in other words, that a double-
negative statute is constitutional even where a single positive would not be.
First, the distinction between positive and negative phrasing cannot be disposi-
tive. Plenty of positive commands comply with the anti-commandeering rule,
as in Garcia and Condon. Likewise, many impermissible commands could be
phrased as prohibitions. 43 For instance, in Printz, the Brady Act could have
prohibited law enforcement from declining requests for background checks
without a change in meaning. Section 1373 could have equally said "all state
governments must confer discretion on their employees to report immigration
information."2̀ 4 Finally, after NFIB, we know that the right of refusal is more
functional than a rigid positive-negative distinction. The Affordable Care Act
did not issue a literal command; it simply authorized the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to withhold federal funds. 45 But the Court looked past
that, to the law's actual effect and purpose.
The effect of § 1373 is the second reason to question its ongoing viability. It
does not simply confer an authority that might not otherwise exist; local offi-
cials were always free, absent a contrary state or local regulation, to share in-
formation. Rather, it cuts off the ability of state and local policymakers-and
thus of state and local electorates-to decide whether to participate in immigra-
tion enforcement. This would sever some important lines of authority within
state government: state legislatures could not supervise state agencies or local
governments, local governments could not supervise local agencies, and agency
chiefs could not supervise their employees.
If the double-negative form cured what would otherwise be forbidden,
Congress could restructure state authority over a vast array of regulatory deci-
sions. In immigration, it could prohibit anti-detainer policies as well. Beyond
immigration, it could mandate that sheriffs' deputies be allowed to complete
Brady Act background checks. It could prohibit departmental policies against
arresting for federal marijuana violations. It could prevent state political
branches from restricting their insurance commissioners' authority to establish
health care exchanges.46 The possibilities are endless. When Congress, in offer-
243. See Hing, supra note 17, at 277 ("Most duties can be characterized either way.").
For a related argument that Congress could not prohibit states from repealing
criminal statutes, see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Mari-
juana and the States' Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1421, 1445-52 (2009).
244. That is, in fact, its effect. One could mount a case that, because state officers' au-
thority comes from state law, see Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305-06
(1958); and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948), section 1373 functions as
a command to the state legislature to confer the relevant authority.
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
246. See Fahey, supra note 2 (explaining that hybrid health insurance exchanges under
the ACA, which allowed insurance commissioners to participate despite their gov-
ernor's disapproval, still required "the state's insurance commissioner [to] attest
to HHS that he or she had the authority under state law to perform the relevant
oversight functions"). Even so, HHS's efforts to single out sympathetic officials in
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ing a federal program, designates what Bridget Fahey has termed a "consent
agent"-an official who is authorized to sign up for the program-it generally
works within the state's pre-existing distribution of authority.2 47 Double nega-
tive statutes go a step further. By dictating where the right of refusal must be lo-
cated-in § 1373's case, in the hands of thousands of line-level employees-
Congress purports to mandate a particular distribution of state authority. 248
There is, of course, a very good reason why Congress has tried to place the
right of refusal where it has. The third reason for doubt, and perhaps the most
important, is the statute's purpose.49 As I explained in Section I.C, inducement
strategies that put downward pressure on state discretion tend to disable poten-
tial resistance. As is clear from § 1373's plain operation, as well as its legislative
history, the whole point was to ensure local cooperation.25 0 The sole purpose is
to attenuate the states' right of refusal, by placing it where it is least likely to be
exercised. This presents real problems under the kind of purposive thinking es-
poused by seven Justices in NFIB.51
implementing the Affordable Care Act bear a striking resemblance to the equiva-
lent tendency in immigration enforcement. Compare id. at 59-64, with supra notes
133-45 and accompanying text.
247. See Fahey, supra note 19, at 1573. But see id. at 1603-08 (explaining how federal pro-
grams sometimes purport to grant state actors ultra vires authority, placing the
onus on other state actors to correct the problem).
248. Even Hills, who has argued for a "presumption of institutional autonomy"-a
presumption that ambiguous state law does not restrict state or local institutions
from exercising federally-conferred authority-is troubled by the prospect that a
state legislature, speaking clearly, "should not be able to veto ... federal-local co-
operation." Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the States: The Use of Federal Law To
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1201,
1249-50, 1271, 1278, 1285 (1999).
249. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (explaining the relevance of pur-
pose).
250. See Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 19-20 (1996)
("The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related infor-
mation by State and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of considera-
ble assistance to, the Federal regulation."); H.R. REP. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2649 ("This provision is de-
signed to prevent any State or local law, ordinance, executive order, policy, consti-
tutional provision, or decision of any Federal or State court that prohibits or in
any way restricts any communication between State and local officials and the
INS.").
251. See supra Section II.D (describing the right of refusal's purposive dimension). The
anti-disclosure regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2016), might pose similar problems if
used broadly to obstruct state and local political processes for supervising en-
forcement decisions. Cf Grant Martinez, Comment, Indefinite Detention of Immi-
grant Information: Federal and State Overreaching in the Interpretation of 8 C.F.R.
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If § 1373 is unconstitutional, then the Second Circuit's opinion upholding
it, City of New York v. United States," was wrongly decided. The City of New
York opinion rested on the second route to legality: the double-negative form.
But it did not confront the restructuring effect or improper purpose outlined
above. Instead, the bulk of the opinion balanced federal and local interests. Ab-
sent local participation, the court worried, "some federal programs may fail or
fall short of their goals."" States, meanwhile, had little interest in "passive re-
sistance that frustrates federal programs."2 54 There are several flaws in this anal-
ysis. For one thing, it is not clear that such free-form balancing was even appro-
priate, because § 1373 is not generally applicable; the court did not explain why a
balancing framework governed.2 5 In applying that framework, the court gave
the city's police-power interest surprisingly short shrift, dismissing it as mere
obstructionism. In fact, it reserved the possibility that more "legitimate munici-
pal functions" might win out.256 That is precisely the picking-and-choosing of
favored government functions the Supreme Court largely abandoned in Gar-
cia.257 Nor did the court explain why the public-safety rationales for New York
City's policy did not fall squarely within states' core police-power interests.
Most importantly, though, the Court has since rejected the Second Circuit's
central concern for harmony in the implementation of federal programs.
"[P]assive resistance that frustrates federal programs" is exactly the option the
Supreme Court has protected in its commandeering and coercion cases."' State
252. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
253. Id. at 35.
254. Id. This conclusion was apparently unaffected by the court's acknowledgment hat
the "obtaining of pertinent information ... may in some cases be difficult or im-
possible if some expectation of privacy is not preserved." Id. at 36.
255. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (noting that federal-local bal-
ance of interests "might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the incidental
application to the States of a federal law of generally applicability excessively inter-
fered with the functioning of state governments" (emphasis in original)). New
York City raised this issue, though not until its reply brief. See Appellants' Reply
Brief at Part J.b, City of New York v. United States, 1998 WL 34099905 (2d Cir. Jan.
9, 1998) (No. 97-6182).
256. City ofNew York, 179 F.3d at 37.
257. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (explaining
that attempts to decide which state functions are most important "inevitably in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies
it favors and which ones it dislikes"). But see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991) (reviving "traditional state function" analysis to a degree, but not as a mat-
ter of free-form interest balancing, and only as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion).
258. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35; see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2604-05 (2012) (recognizing a state's "'prerogative' to reject Congress's de-
sired policy, 'not merely in theory but in fact"' (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987))). In Printz, too, it was clear that the federal government
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and local governments who choose not to help administer a federal program are
under no obligation to nonetheless offer their employees' "voluntary coopera-
tion."2 9 Put simply, the Supreme Court has embraced a more competitive
model of federal-state relations than the City of New York opinion espoused. 26o
The Court has also expressed some pointed skepticism about federal power
to unilaterally reallocate state authority. In Lopez, Justice Kennedy famously
warned that it would violate "the etiquette of federalism" for the federal gov-
ernment to direct a state "to organize its governmental functions in a certain
way.""' More recently, the Court noted that "there are limits on the Federal
Government's power to affect the internal operations of a State."26 2 Once again,
Justice Kennedy doubted that the federal government could demand "far-
reaching changes with respect to [a state's] governmental structure or its basic
could not have implemented the background check system during the interim pe-
riod on its own. 521 U.S. at 902.
259. City of New York, 179 F-3d at 34-35. The court made much of the fact that the City
was not just declining to affirmatively participate in immigration enforcement, it
was blocking its employees' "voluntary" participation. Id. But a government that
adopts a policy can presumably make its employees follow that policy.
260. Beyond the bare observation that local participation was useful to the federal gov-
ernment, the court cited two additional reasons to favor cooperation. First, some
states defied federal law in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), forcing unnecessary resort to the courts; second, the Supremacy Clause re-
quires that states not frustrate federal law. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35. Of
course local governments cannot disobey federal law. But that axiom does not
speak to whether any given federal law is constitutional in the first place. The Su-
premacy Clause did not rescue the Brady Act provision in Printz.
261. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Granted,
that can happen under a Garcia-type state-regulating statute. But those statutes do
not carry a right of refusal. Here, by construction, the question is whether that can
happen as to the enforcement of individual-regulating federal law.
262. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart (VOPA), 563 U.S. 247, 260 (2011) (citing
Printz, 521 U.S. 898, and Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (19u)); see id. at 261
(opining that a state agency's authority to sue other state officials, while not con-
strained by the Eleventh Amendment, still "cannot exist without the consent of the
State that created the agency and defined its powers" (emphasis added)). It is no
answer that localities are not state actors for purposes of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court has rejected a federal-state distinction in the Tenth
Amendment context, where it has held that local actors are state actors. See Printz,
521 U.S. at 930-31, 931 n.15. Besides, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is riddled
with irregularities that have little purchase outside of that context. Compare, e.g.,
VOPA, 563 U.S. at 259 (distinguishing between a suit "against an unconsenting
State, rather than against its officers"), with Printz, 521 U.S. at 931 ("To say that the
Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control all of its officers, is
to say nothing of significance.").
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policies of governance," even as a condition of federal funds.263 Thus, if Con-
gress cannot deny states their right of refusal, it is unlikely that Congress can
formally restrict who gets to exercise it.26 4 A court applying the right of refusal
would therefore need to part ways with the Second Circuit.
C. Local Spending Threats
Federal-local spending programs are another set of inducement strategies
for maintaining integrated immigration enforcement. They raise a number of
doctrinal and theoretical questions about the place of states-and their constit-
uent parts-in our constitutional order. Should multiple spending conditions
be analyzed for coercion individually, or in the aggregate? Does the anti-
coercion rule protect localities, or just states? Which pots of funding can Con-
gress, in fact, threaten? This Section begins to unpack these questions, which are
pressing far beyond immigration. From education to transportation to housing,
federal-local grants shape the policies that govern people's daily lives.
1. The Threatened Programs
Most of the local-enforcement proposals that have emerged since the
summer of 2015 would cut off some combination of four different spending
programs. Before discussing the constitutional questions they raise, I will briefly
describe each program.
The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program reimburses state and local
jails and prisons for some non-citizen detention costs.' SCAAP funds already
come with one condition: they "may be used only for correctional purposes.""
Payouts have varied between $200 million and $6oo million per year since the
1995, though the program has never covered more than one quarter of costs na-
263. VOPA, 563 U.S. at 265 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 263 (recognizing
"the State's important sovereign interest in using its own courts to control the dis-
tribution of power among its own agents").
264. Hills has argued that this vision of "state supremacy" is less grounded in case law
than commonly assumed. Hills, supra note 248, at 1207-16. Compare id. at 1210-12,
with supra Section II.D, supra note 262, and infra notes 286-89 and accompanying
text. Regardless, § 1373 goes beyond the disaggregation of states from localities that
is the focus of his study. It disaggregates all state actors from all others. Read liter-
ally, it would leave each and every state and local employee free to weigh the pros
and cons of participating in immigration enforcement for herself.
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i)(3) (2012). SCAAP pays for detentions of four consecutive days or
more, but only for "undocumented criminal aliens," defined as those convicted of
a felony or at least two misdemeanors, and who did not have legal status at the
time of their arrest.
266. Id. § 1231(i)(6).
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tionwide. 67 Probably because of the consecutive-four-day requirement, the ma-
jority of SCAAP funding goes to states, whose prisons tend to house those serv-
ing longer and more serious sentences.6 1
The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program is
"the leading source of federal justice funding to state and local jurisdictions."29
It gives states and localities money for use throughout the criminal justice sys-
tem, for policing, adjudication, incarceration, technology, drug treatment, and
education.270 The program disburses block grants according to a statutory for-
mula, 71 with few conditions or restrictions. Since 2005, Congress has generally
appropriated between $40o and $6oo million for the JAG program.72 In fiscal
year 2015-the most recent year for which data are available-the total fell to
$246.5 million. 73 Of course, the total amount received by each state and locality
varies dramatically. California received $17 million in 2015, while Virginia re-
ceived $3.2 million.2 74 Wayne County, Michigan, which includes Detroit, re-
267. See Ann Morse, The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/resarch/immigration/
state-criminal-alien-assistance-program.aspx [http://perma.cc/K8VV-HS4J].




269. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program
Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.bja.gov/Publications/JAG
Fact Sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/8WCT-U9UB].
270. See Bureau of Justice Assistance, Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
(JAG) Program: FY 2o5 Local Solicitation, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (May 12, 2015), http://
www.bja.gov/Funding/15JAGLocalSol.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9QF-MQBP].
271. 42 U.S.C. § 3755 (2012).
272. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22416, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM 6 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS22416.pdf [http://perma.cc/WW46-9NXB].
273. See Bureau of Justice Assistance, Awards Made for Solicitation: BJA FY 15 Edward
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program - State Solicitation, U.S.




that the program dispersed $168,121,634 to states in FY 2015); Bureau of Justice As-
sistance, Awards Made for Solicitation: BJA FY 15 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice




3H4W-XHYU] (reporting that the program dispersed $78,331,338 to localities in FY
2015).
274. See State JAG Grants 2015, supra note 273.
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ceived $1.3 million; most cities and counties received less than $50,ooo." Slight-
ly over half of these funds are used for policing activities."
The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program also funds a
variety of state, local, and tribal criminal functions, especially the hiring of law
enforcement officers. 77 It was created by the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA).78 While it is hard to quantify exactly how
many police officers were hired because of COPS, it appears that the program
has funded upwards of ioo,ooo officers since its inception.279 COPS funding has
generally fluctuated between $400 million and $i billion over the last decade.280
Unlike in Byrne-JAG, all COPS grants go directly to localities, not states.2
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program is adminis-
tered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It funds a wide
range of local government expenditures, including affordable housing, small
business development, disaster recovery, and other programs to help low-
income communities; it does not fund law enforcement."' As its name suggests,
the program provides block grants, which give recipients wide latitude in de-
termining how to spend the funds.83 The CDBG program is bigger than any of
275. Id.
276. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Grant Activity Report: Justice Assistance Grant (JAG)
Program, April 2o12-March 2013, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 1, 2 fig.2 (2013), http://www.bja
.gov/Publications/JAGLEGrant Activity-o3-13.pdf [http://perma.cc/XB9B-
MWCQ].
277. See generally NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40709, COMMUNITY
ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS): CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 1 (2014) [here-
inafter JAMES, COPS II], http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750104 [http://perma.cc/
QV82-NLPX] (describing the program).
278. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (2012)).
279. See JAMES, COPS II, supra note 277, at 10-13 (explaining the competing claims
about the precise number of police officers paid through COPS funds). In 20n, the
COPS Office claimed that, as of 2004, the program had led to the hiring of over
117,ooo new officers. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL3308, COMMUNITY
ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS): BACKGROUND, LEGISLATION, AND FUNDING 1
& n.5 (2011) [hereinafter JAMES, COPS I], http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL333o8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L4BY-2NL6].
280. JAMES, COPS I, supra note 279, at 4.
281. See Byrne JAG, COPS and SCAAP Grant Awards by State, supra note 268.
282. See Community Development Block Grant Program - CDBG, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING &
URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program-offices/comm
planning/communitydevelopment/programs [http://perma.cc/8GKV-RMTR].
The program was first authorized by the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633-2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq.
(2012)).
283. See EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4352o, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
BLOCK GRANTS AND RELATED PROGRAMS: A PRIMER 1-2 (Apr. 30, 2014), http://
www.nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R4352o.pdf [http://
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the law enforcement programs. Its appropriation for fiscal year 2015 was over $3
billion. 24
2. Cross-Cutting Conditions
Most of the local-enforcement bills would withhold some combination of
the four programs discussed above from localities that adopt anti-detainer or
anti-notification policies. This situation is different from the Supreme Court's
canonical Spending Clause cases-Pennhurst, Dole, NFIB-which involved one
condition attached to one grant. When a new condition cuts across multiple
programs, should a court review each program in isolation, or the whole condi-
tion? What happens when the condition is coercive in the aggregate but non-
coercive in particular applications?
Those questions are simplified a bit by the fact that conditions that direct
the use of funds definitionally cannot coerce. These conditions effectively define
the scope of the program itself, as I explained in Section II.C. By contrast, con-
ditions that "are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept
policy changes""' can and do coerce. These must therefore be aggregated.
While there may be some appeal to the notion that courts faced with coercive
cross-cutting conditions could pare down the threat to a non-coercive size, in
practice, there would be no way to choose which ones to jettison. Disaggrega-
tion might also lead courts into overly fine distinctions of where, exactly, threats
become coercive-distinctions the Court has clearly sought to avoid with its
know-it-when-you-see-it approach in NFIB, Dole, and Steward Machine.
This yields a fairly straightforward update to the Spending Clause doctrine
outlined in Sectiop II.C: a court facing a challenge to a cross-cutting condition,
like those presented in the local-enforcement bills, should disregard the applica-
tions that direct the use of funds, strike down non-germane applications, and
then analyze the remaining applications in the aggregate.
3. Local Grant Programs
Another open question concerns the impact of NFIB on federal-local
spending programs. All the grants in the local-enforcement bills-along with
many other federal grants-go to local governments and agencies, either direct-
ly or through the states. To judge these inducement approaches, we must know
whether and how the anti-coercion rule applies to local governments.
perma.cc/G7BH-7A7V]. For a discussion of the difference between block grants
and their more tailored counterpart, categorical grants, see ROBERT JAY DILGER &
EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4o486, BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND
CONTROVERSIES (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R4o486.pdf [http://perma.cc/
WB2H-XPH6].
284. See CPD Appropriations Budget, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URB. DEv., http://portal
.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program offices/comm-planning/about/budget/
[http://perma.cc/299Q-NMH7].
285. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603-04 (2012).
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On the "whether" question, there are good reasons to think that the answer
is yes. We know, from Printz, that the federal government may not comman-
deer local officials. As the Court put it, referring to county sheriffs, "[t]o say
that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control all of its
officers, is to say nothing of significance."" The Court rejected the dissent's re-
liance on the fact that sovereign immunity did not protect local officials, be-
cause the Eleventh Amendment's state-local distinction was "peculiar" to its
context." From a formal standpoint, the right of refusal arises under the Tenth
Amendment, which means that there is no doctrinal reason to exclude local ac-
tors from its ambit."' The same is true from a functional standpoint: if Con-
gress cannot mandate local regulatory action, why should it be able to effectively
force that action by threatening to cripple local finances?'"
The "how" question is more difficult, because there are some meaningful
differences between state and local governments. Local governments have much
smaller budgets. They regulate different kinds of activity. There is plenty of
overlap, but on the whole, local governments handle different policy areas, and
law enforcement takes up a much bigger share.29 o That difference matters, be-
286. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930-31, 931 n.15 (1997).
287. Id.; see id. at 955 n.16, 965 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For more on why the Eleventh
Amendment analogy is unhelpful, see supra note 262. In its previous encounters
with congressional power to regulate the states, the Court had similarly either said
outright, or appeared to assume, that a state's federalism protections extended to
its subdivisions. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 n.20 (1976).
288. Also, many ostensibly local actors are actually treated as state officials, for purpos-
es of both state and federal law. For instance, in many states, district attorneys and
sheriffs are considered state officials and answer directly to the state attorney gen-
eral. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13; Hicks v. Bd. of Supervisors, 69 Cal. App. 3d 228,
242 (Ct. App. 1977) (explaining that under the California Constitution, a county
district attorney "acts by the authority and in the name of the people of the state").
The same is true for sovereign immunity purposes under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. See, e.g., McMillan v. Monroe City, 520 U.S. 781, 783 (1997) ("We hold that,
as to the actions at issue here, Sheriff Tate represents the State of Alabama and is
therefore not a county policymaker.").
289. For a different take, see Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebe-
lius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 652-55 (2013).
Professor Pasachoff would not apply the anti-coercion rule to localities, primarily
because the Court considered states the repositories of sovereignty in NFIB, and
because such application would raise substantial doctrinal challenges. I do not dis-
pute the second point, as this Section makes clear, though I do think the right of
refusal winnows the analysis down to the coerced actor's own budget. As to the
first, NFIB understood coercion to cause the exact same harm as commandeering,
which localities are clearly protected from. If coercion is simply commandeering's
functional counterpart, as Section II.D argues, then, at least in principal, neither
should be available to compel local officials to enforce federal law.
290. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, go N.Y.U.
L. REV. 870, 948 & n-322 (2015) ("Overwhelmingly, police department funds come
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cause it means that local governments-and especially sheriffs and police
chiefs-might have a different point at which a threat feels like "a gun to the
head."'9 '
Even if sensible in the abstract, then protecting local government from co-
ercive spending threats could pose a number of practical problems. One might
object that there are big differences across local budgets,'9 and so a condition
that coerces one might barely affect another; how would courts decide whose
budget percentages "count"? One might also object that a percentage-based
analysis might encourage localities, and their state patrons, to reduce their own
funding in response to federal grants;2 93 the less of their own money they spent,
the more likely they would be to "lock in" their federal funds as a constitutional
matter. The problem with both of these objections is that they are equally true
of conditions that coerce states, and are thus insufficient to distinguish NFIB.
They still could have some role to play in coercion doctrine as applied to both
levels of government: the first objection might counsel against allowing as-
applied challenges; the second might weigh in favor of reserving the rule for ex-
treme situations.2 94 But these are criticisms of the rule the Court has already
adopted, not any future application.
A more problematic counter is that the state, with its larger budget, could
simply make up for post-cutoff shortfalls in local budgets. After all, the argu-
ment would go, states are the real source of autonomy, and the state is not co-
erced by a drop-in-the-bucket removal of federal funds from one of its subdivi-
sions. This is an argument not that the federal government should be allowed to
coerce local governments, but that, in practice, it will not, because states will
have the ability, if they want, to restore their officers' and subdivisions' ability to
turn down federal programs.
This is ultimately an empirical question with no easy answers. It is certainly
possible that state governments are arranged in such a way that they can and will
selectively restore this kind of lost funding. But in many states, there are real di-
visions between state and local fiscal authority, with some services funded most-
ly or completely at the local level. A local official facing a large shortfall could
from local governments, and policing consumes a large part of municipal budg-
ets.").
291. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
292. The percentage of county budgets devoted to law enforcement varies dramatically.
For instance, Cococino County, Arizona spent almost a third of its 2007 budget on
public safety and corrections. See NACo County Explorer, NAT'L Ass'N COUNTIES,
http://cic.naco.org/index.html?dset=Justice%20%26%2oPublic%20Safety/20
Expenditures&ind=Total%2oCounty [http://perma.cc/VGF8-8U4H]. Los Angeles
County spent about a quarter. Id. Hamilton County, New York spent just under
thirteen percent. Id. Lauderdale County, Tennessee spent under ten percent. Id.
293. There are indications that this already happens in practice. See Harmon, supra
note 290, at 952; Hills, supra note 248, at 1202.
294. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (joint dissent) ("[C]ourts should not conclude that
legislation is unconstitutional on [coercion] ground[s] unless the coercive nature
of an offer is unmistakably clear.").
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not expect the state to ride to his rescue absent an alteration to the state's fiscal
structure, which may be set by statute or constitution. 95 In other words, it is
equally possible that, in practice, no law enforcement chief would be free to re-
fuse a condition attached to all, or most, pre-existing federal funds. If that is
true, then giving the federal government free reign to threaten those funds
might result in the practical ability to direct all kinds of affirmative police ac-
tion-an outcome that seems in tension with NFIB's insistence that we look to
how things will play out on the ground.
The resolution of this issue will turn on a number of factors that are hard to
predict: how courts think intrastate relations actually work; how "realistically"
they apply NFIB; how solicitous they are of local government's ability to func-
tion as an alternative site of power, independent of the state.2"' It might also re-
quire a reexamination of exactly why local actors may not be commandeered.
The majority in Printz did not explain in detail. If it is because they speak for
the state, in some constitutional sense, then the Tenth Amendment might pro-
tect their right of refusal quite comprehensively. But if it is because the central
state government-as the "real" site of autonomy-cannot control their behav-
ior when they are commandeered, then coercion might stand on a different
footing. In other words, we need to know exactly who "the state" is.
Note, however, that these uncertainties only attach at the coercion stage of
the Spending Clause analysis. Directing conditions are still per se constitutional,
and non-germane conditions are still per se unconstitutional. Those rules are
enough to assess at least some of the proposed spending cut-offs in the local-
enforcement bills.
4. Applying the Right of Refusal
At the outset, both notification and detainer conditions appear to direct the
use of SCAAP funds. Funds granted under SCAAP are specifically tied to the
incarceration of deportable immigrants, and they can only be used for correc-
tional purposes.9 7 It is true that the program only funds a fraction of actual de-
tention costs.'9 But in many programs, Congress imposes conditions on activi-
ties it funds only a portion of. Assuming the Court, in NFIB, did not intend to
upend decades of cooperative regulatory programs, the use of funds must not
be analyzed at such a low level of generality.99 In the terms of my taxonomy,
these conditions would simply change SCAAP from an offer to a trade: Con-
295. See Christopher Hoene & Michael A. Pagano, Research Report on America's Cities:
Cities & State Fiscal Structure, NAT'L LEAGUE CITIES 11, 14 (2015), http://www.nlc
.org/documents/Find%20Cityo/2oSolutions/Research%2olnnovation/Finance/
cities-state-fiscal-structure-20o8-rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/5U7C-BVAE].
296. For arguments that they should be, see Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism:
Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959 (2007);
and Hills, supra note 124.
297. See 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(i)(6) (2012).
298. See supra note 265 and accompanying text (explaining SCAAP funding formula).
299. See Bagenstos, supra note 180, at 912-16.
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gress would essentially be saying that it will help pay for detention, but only if
part of the funds are used to report on and extend that detention in certain cas-
es.300
Things are less clear for the other programs, most of which do not fund
jails, prisons, or anything to do with immigrants. For instance, the officers
whose salaries are funded by the COPS program are almost never the ones re-
ceiving detainer and notification requests. Then again, as I argued in Section
III.A, notification and detainers do not simply request one quick email from
one jail official. They enlist the entire law enforcement process, from investiga-
tion to arrest to detention. Thus, a more plausible narrative might be that fed-
eral funds for, say, officer salaries can only be used to fund officers whose po-
lice-work is subject to later reporting. Interestingly, this pits the legality of
mandatory reporting against the legality of the proposed funding cut-offs. The
more notification co-opts the whole law enforcement process, the less viable it
is as a mandate, but the more viable it is as a condition on funding for earlier
stages of that process. That said, I doubt a court would dilute the inquiry this
far. A requirement that jail officials honor detainers hardly seems to direct the
use of funds that pay for new squad cars, or a patrol officer's salary, or a prose-
cutor's salary. This means that threats to cut off COPS, JAG, and other law en-
forcement grants cannot be per se constitutional on those grounds. Neither can
the Community Development Block Grant program, whose funds have little to
do with law enforcement, much less immigration.
On the other hand, most of the conditions are probably germane to the lo-
cal law enforcement funds. The local-enforcement proposals, in their propo-
nents' telling, are designed to improve public safety by facilitating the removal
of non-citizen criminals. That purpose is certainly germane to law enforcement
grants under a deferential analysis.3"' This is not to endorse the proponents' as-
sumption that local participation in immigration enforcement improves public
safety; indeed, many law enforcement officials, immigrant communities, state
and local governments, and scholars dispute it.30 2 But a deferential germaneness
analysis requires crediting the federal government's plausible policy assump-
tions.
The same cannot be said, however, for Community Development Block
Grants, which fund local activities like affordable housing and small business
development. If immigration enforcement were related to that purpose, it
would obliterate the germaneness requirement, which every member of the Su-
preme Court has recently re-endorsed.303 This application of the condition
therefore fails under Dole. The same is true, necessarily, for the recent proposals
300. See supra Sections I.B.2, I.B.3 (discussing offers and trades). The Department of
Justice's Office of Justice Programs, which disburses local law enforcement grants,
has recently interpreted the SCAAP and JAG grants to already be conditioned on
compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. See supra note 113.
301. See supra Section II.C (explaining that the germaneness analysis is highly deferen-
tial).
302. See supra note 234.
303. See supra note 182.
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that would reach even further to cut off all funding to local governments.30 4
Federal grants fund local projects as diverse as roads, schools, and hospitals.
While the germaneness requirement may be underdeveloped, it does still exist.
Such an indiscriminate threat, leveled for no purpose other than to undermine
the right of refusal, seems like exactly the kind of spending condition the ger-
maneness requirement would prevent.
That leaves COPS and JAG. If the anti-coercion rule extends to local insti-
tutions, threats to these programs would have to be considered jointly. As I ar-
gued in Section III.C.3, it is difficult to know how that analysis should play
out-whose budget to consider, for instance-without answers to some deeper
questions about local government's role in federalism. There is also a further
obstacle to assessing these threats' legality, which is that macrodata on the per-
centages of local budgets funded by specific federal law enforcement grants does
not yet exist.30 5 Assembling that dataset is beyond the scope of this Article, but it
is an essential project for future study, both for answering this particular ques-
tion, and for examining the larger issue of how much leverage, in practice, the
federal government has over local policing practices. For now, it is enough to
say that the right of refusal probably protects local governments, not just states,
and that threats to cut off non-law-enforcement funds probably fail the Dole
test.
IV. NORMATIVE DEBATES ABOUT FEDERALISM AND INDUCEMENT
This Part moves beyond the case law to explore immigration enforcement's
intersection with scholarly claims about cooperative federalism. Since New
York, debate has simmered over the wisdom of protecting states from comman-
deering. Now, in the wake of NFIB, that question has purchase across a number
of federal-state interactions. The new question is where, and to what degree,
courts should protect the right of refusal.
A satisfying answer to that question must, of course, refer to the values
served by federalism. We cannot know if a rule makes sense without some nor-
mative baseline about the ends the rule is meant to serve. Courts and scholars
have identified a long list of values associated with federalism. My goal in this
Part is not to balance their relative importance. It is simply to show how immi-
304. See supra note 114.
305. See Harmon, supra note 290, at 937-38 ("It is unclear how much of [local law en-
forcement] spending comes from the federal government, since there is no author-
itative list of federal government grant programs that seek to promote public safe-
ty, and the programs vary significantly from year to year."). That said, it is clear
that all federal programs combined constitute an enormous share of local gov-
ernment budgets. See, e.g., Aaron Elstein, Trump's Attack on 'Sanctuary Cities'
Could Cost New York Dearly, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www
.crainsnewyork.com/article/2016o9o1/POLITICS/16o9o9988/donald-trumps
-attack-on-sanctuary-cities-could-cost-new-york-dearly [http://perma.cc/QR93
-YNT4]. As a result, the recent threats to withhold all federal funding most likely
violate the coercion prohibition, in addition to the germaneness requirement. See
supra note 114 and accompanying text (describing those threats).
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gration enforcement speaks to some recurring themes in the ongoing conversa-
tion about how constitutional doctrine serves different federalism values. Be-
cause federalism scholars have tended not to closely engage with immigration, it
has yet to leave its full mark on these broader debates. This Part begins that pro-
ject. I explore the right of refusal's impact on state and local autonomy, subfed-
eral participation in national dialogue, individual liberty, and accountability.3 06
A. State and Local Autonomy
Many critics of the anti-commandeering doctrine have argued that states'
regulatory authority is actually enhanced, not constricted, by commandeering.
The story goes that by carrying out federal regulatory programs, states retain
power over implementation decisions, instead of being sidelined altogether by
federal regulators.30 7 This insight conceives of state autonomy not as a negative
right-the hermit's prerogative to be left alone-but rather the positive capabil-
ity to project influence, to make active decisions.30s On this account, preemp-
tion is the real danger to autonomy because it kicks states out of the game alto-
gether.30 9 If that is true, we might welcome mandated participation and instead
focus on narrowing the scope of preemption.
For this account to be accurate, however, there must be some residual
choice left for commandeered officials to make. A servant assigned only a rote
task cannot shape broader policy, and might not even wield influence at the
margins. In other words, not all commandeering is created equal. An open-
ended command to address a certain problem, as in New York, might leave the
regulator with real sway over the details of implementation. But a narrow, dis-
cretion-less directive leaves no influence over any policy choices.
That is the case with immigration detainers and notification requests. There
are no choices left to make when a jail receives a directive to hold a specific per-
son for a specific amount of time, or an order to provide a certain piece of in-
formation. There is no leeway in "determin[ing] the ways and means of com-
plying with [the] overriding requisition."3 0 State and local governments thus
have little autonomy or influence to gain from this kind of conscription.
Nor should we worry about the other half of the equation-the specter of
preemption-when it comes to the police. The federal government cannot
preempt local policing the way it can preempt, say, mine regulation (Hodel) or
306. For an analysis of federalism values in the context of immigration preemption, see
Huntington, supra note 15, at 830-38.
307. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 945 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); Siegel, supra note 208, at 1634.
308. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 166 (1969);
see also AMARTYA SEN, ON THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2009) (conceiving of liberty as
positive capability, not simply freedom from restraint); David J. Barron, A Localist
Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 383 (2001) (invoking positive au-
tonomy in a governmental context).
309. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 n.29 (1982).
310. Printz, 521 U.S. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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utility ratemaking (FERC). Neither could the federal government use its own
agents to achieve the same effect. The cost would be orders of magnitude higher
than is currently devoted to all federal law enforcement combined." And, as
explained above, the federal government lacks authority to prohibit, and thus to
police for, the kinds of criminal-law violations that are currently the main entry
point into the immigration system.3" 2 The advantage of local police, from the
federal government's standpoint, is not just their ubiquity, but the specific na-
ture of their authority-authority that no federal police force can ever have.
This does not mean that arguments connecting compelled participation to
autonomy are wrong, it just suggests some normative granularity. While forced
participation in national governance might often increase the influence of sub-
federal legislatures and administrative agencies-as with large spending pro-
grams like Medicaid3 13-the script is flipped when it comes to the police, and
possibly other enforcement actors too. The question of whether that difference
should spell doctrinal granularity will have to await future work.314
B. Voice and Negotiation
Federalism scholars have long debated whether integration or independ-
ence makes states more likely to speak up-and be heard-on questions of fed-
eral policy. Many have noted these potential "discursive benefits of structure,"
to borrow Professor Heather Gerken's phrase.3 15 Scholars have split, however,
over how best to foster that kind of participation. Some have argued that exit
options discourage voice, by making it too easy to opt out of federal programs
on procedural grounds.316 Others have responded that the exit option is precise-
311. As of 20o8, state and local officers with general arrest powers outnumbered all fed-
eral law enforcement agents by a factor of almost seven. They outnumbered cur-
rent ICE employees (including prosecutors) thirty-seven to one. See Who We Are,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about [http://perma
.cc/BT2G-R6H6]; Brian A. Reaves, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2oo8, U.S.
DEP'T JUST. 1 (June 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleoo8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZWX6-MTLC]; Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies, 2oo8, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 1 (July 2011), http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/cslleao8.pdf [http://perma.cc/5SV9-2L8E].
312. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014); United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
313. See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and
the Old-Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1766 (2013).
314. See also Siegel, supra note 208, at 1635 (arguing for different levels of scrutiny for
commandeering based on the availability of alternatives).
315. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1894 (2014).
316. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19, at 1295-1301 (arguing that the ability to
opt out "may decrease, even eliminate, [states'] incentive to reshape or challenge
federal policy," whereas "having to enforce federal law [] may drive states to con-
test such law on the merits").
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ly what makes voice credible-that without the ability to opt out, subfederal aid
will be taken for granted.317
Immigration enforcement adds one important data point to this discussion.
Integration has produced wide-ranging vertical friction, allowing communities
across the country to weigh in on national policy-a capability they might not
have had without federal reliance on their police forces. In the last decade, al-
most every sheriff, police chief, mayor, and governor has had to take a position
on immigration policy. Such diffuse and visible debate is almost inconceivable
without the very real prospect of federal imposition on local services. It has also
produced some tangible federal policy changes. After extensive state and local
resistance, DHS acceded to the particular demand for fewer detainers, and more
generally, agreed to restructure some of its enforcement practices in line with
the substantive demands of its subfederal counterparties."
It is crucial to note, though, that constitutional protection from forced par-
ticipation has been essential to this influence. State and local governments have
affected federal policy's formation (who gets prioritized) and implementation
(who gets deported), but only by turning down detainer and notification re-
quests when they object. Where law enforcement officials have interpreted de-
tainers to be mandatory, they have been anything but vocal in their opposi-
tion.319 This is the lesson of inducement by downward pressure: it puts
decisions in the hands of those who are least likely to challenge federal policy,
especially if it is binding.32 o Conversely, the ability to opt out on procedural
grounds has not prevented sheriffs and governors from challenging the merits
of that policy. Many have spoken up about both the number and distribution of
people being deported. In this case, a hard right of refusal has enabled, not de-
flated, a robust national conversation about the merits of federal policy.
C. Policing and Liberty
Since the Court started striking down statutes on federalism grounds, the
federalism value it has most prized is individual liberty. This line of thinking has
been around for some time. In Federalist No. 51, James Madison famously de-
scribed the Constitution's federal system as creating a "double security" for "the
rights of the people."3 1 Alexander Hamilton similarly described federalism as
317. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federal-
ism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 704 (2001) (citing ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 36-43
(1970)).
318. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law
Red ux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2016) (explaining DAPA as an attempt to formalize the
exercise of discretion); Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative
Law Struggle Behind President Obama's Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV.
665 (2016).
319. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Section I.C.
321. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 51, 323 (James Madison).
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allowing each level of government "to check the usurpations" of the other."'
These days, it is rare to see a federalism case that does not invoke the notion of
two-tiered government protecting liberty.323
And yet, in practice, the connection between federalism and liberty can be a
bit abstract. Does separate-spheres federalism always, necessarily, protect indi-
vidual liberty? Many of the areas in which the Court has most aggressively en-
forced federalism limitations involve federal attempts to protect individual
rights against states.32 4 We have no way to empirically judge what effect this
boundary-guarding has on individual rights. At times, then, it can be hard to
grasp how diffusion actually protects anyone's liberty.
Things get less abstract when you consider the coercive power of the police.
In their daily decisions, they are entrusted with balancing public order and pri-
vate freedom. Those decisions determine the "effective meaning of the law."325
They represent the node in the chain of sanctions where law's imposition shifts
from the theoretical to the physical. And as a result, they have the potential to
pose perhaps the greatest menace to individual liberty, because they have the
power to most literally curtail it.
For those reasons, federal-local law enforcement integration should draw
particular attention from those concerned with federalism and liberty. As Jus-
tice Scalia put it in Printz, "[t]he power of the Federal Government would be
augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service-and at no
cost to itself-the police officers of the 50 States.""326 Justice Stevens, in dissent,
322. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 28, 18o (Alexander Hamilton).
323. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012); Bond v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-22 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 181 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (calling the pro-
tection of liberty "[p]erhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system"). There
are plenty more examples, but they are unnecessary, and too numerous, to list.
324. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013); Alden, 527 U.S. 706. Of
course, the connection is clearer when the Court reverses criminal convictions for
exceeding the enumerated powers. E.g., Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers To Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1075 (1995)
("The most obvious and direct way that power diffusion protects against the threat
of federal tyranny is simply by placing legal limits on the scope of authority al-
lowed the federal government."). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federal-
ism: Converse-1983 in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (1994) (seeking a federal-
ism-liberty nexus that is "crisper and more precise than the simple suggestion that
diffusion of political power will generally prevent tyranny").
325. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 700
(2011); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57 (1988) (advocating stronger
constitutional protection for local control of police, because of their "substantial
discretion over what conduct constitutes a crime," "when to effect an arrest," and
"how vigorously to enforce the law").
326. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
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found that prospect ridiculous. The majority's "alarmist hypothetical," he
wrote, "is no more persuasive than the likelihood that Congress would actually
enact any such program."" And yet that is exactly what has happened with
immigration enforcement. Since 2008, federal immigration agents have asked
local police to arrest tens of thousands of people every month. This integration,
though especially high-volume in immigration enforcement, has proliferated in
other areas of policing too.328
Plenty of scholars have explored the post-9/11 ramp-up of local anti-terror
policing.2 9 Fewer have considered the prospect of a more quotidian integration.
One exception is a recent article by Professor Rachel Harmon, which explores
the ways federal funds obscure "the coercion costs of policing."33o As she ex-
plains, those funds augment local police capabilities without accounting for
consequent harms to individual liberty, property, and privacy.3 They also
weaken local political control by freeing law enforcement agencies from local
budget pressures.3 This analysis suggests that some of the same federal-state
dynamics are at play in both immigration and criminal enforcement-most no-
tably, downward pressure on state discretion. Even so, the inducement strate-
gies that threaten the funds Harmon describes take things even further. Instead
of simply freeing local police to expand their activities, these threats seek to di-
rectly control those activities.
Cooperative immigration enforcement thus shows one way that federal
structure might safeguard liberty: by requiring the assent of a second govern-
ment (and even a third, if you count the state and locality separately) before co-
ercive action is taken against an individual. At the start of the federalism revival
of the 1990s, Professor Akhil Amar speculated that the Court's renewed atten-
tion to the structure-liberty nexus might allow a more active role for the states
in protecting individual rights against the federal government.3  While the
327. Id. at 959 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
328. See K. JACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM (2005); Harris, supra note 54, at 9-12; Michael C. Waxman, Police and
National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/n,
3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 377, 383-85 (2008) (describing the increased role of local
police in preventing terrorism).
329. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Vigor of the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004); Michael C. Waxman, National Security Fed-
eralism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012).
330. Harmon, supra note 290. Professor Anil Kalhan has also noted the "liberty-
enhancing potential of federalism" in the immigration context, where state and lo-
cal governments might act as "moderating influences on the federal actors who
seek their cooperation." Anil Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism Af-
ter September ni, 2ool, in IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: AMERICA AND
EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 181, 197-98 (Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia &
Simon Reich eds., 2008).
331. Harmon, supra note 290, at 912-36.
332. Id. at 944.
333. Amar, supra note 324, at 1246-49.
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states have not yet tried his particular proposal-a "converse-1983" statute to
enforce state constitutional rights against federal officerS33 4-integrated en-
forcement may give states an opportunity to hold up their end of the "double
security" outside the courts."'
D. Accountability
Accountability, though a slippery concept, has long been extolled as one of
federalism's main virtues. Smaller governments are more accountable to their
citizens, goes the theory, because "local laws can be adapted to local conditions
and local tastes,"36 and because the "smaller scale of local government allows
individuals to participate actively in governmental decisionmaking."3 37 The Su-
preme Court invoked this value to justify the commandeering prohibition in
New York, reasoning that federal mandates blurred the lines of accountability
between citizens and their governments, both federal and state.338 The Court's
understanding of accountability was a fairly narrow one: "it may be state offi-
cials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials
who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision."339 In other words, voters will not know whom
to blame. The Court doubled down on this rationale in Printz3 40 and stuck to its
guns in NFIB.3 41
For as long as the accountability rationale has existed, commentators have
maligned it. They have pointed out that preemption, conditional spending, and
conditional non-preemption similarly blur lines of accountability. 4 They have
also questioned whether commandeering actually diminishes the kind of ac-
countability the Court has articulated; concerned voters can surely discern the
source of unpopular policies, and commandeered officials (along with the me-
dia) will have every reason to communicate as much.3 43 The voter confusion
334. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1512-17
(1987).
335. See Althouse, supra note 329 (also noting this possibility in the context of terrorism
and national emergencies).
336. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1493 (1987).
337. See Merritt, supra note 325, at 7-8; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991).
338. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
339. Id. at 169; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
340. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30.
341. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-03 (2012).
342. See Caminker, supra note 324, at 1054-55; Jackson, supra note 208, at 2202; Siegel,
supra note 208, at 1632.
343. See Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure ofAmeri-
can Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REv. 1, 14 (2015); Siegel, supra note 208, at 1632-33.
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hypothesis is, at best, an extremely speculative grounding for a major pillar of
constitutional law-what if evidence emerged that voters were not confused?3 44
The practice of immigration enforcement has posed richer, more complex
puzzles of accountability. In the actual interactions between federal and state
actors, between state and local actors, and between local governments and their
constituents, accountability has been a very real concern, just not exactly in the
way the Court and its critics have imagined.
The most obvious example is the confusion over the legal meaning of de-
tainers. As I explained in Section I.C, local governments and law enforcement
officials spent years not knowing whether detainers were mandatory or not.
They were abetted in this confusion by a combination of misleading language
on the detainer form and silence from federal officials. Citing this uncertainty,
many local officials rebuffed constituent pleas to adopt legally available policies.
Some even hewed to the misunderstanding as a way of challenging state anti-
detainer laws34 5-a position that, even if disingenuous, would have been far less
tenable without the preceding years of confusion. Thus, the federal-local inter-
action has at times played out in a way that obscures, from both constituents
and their governments, the nature of the policy choices available to them.
Another accountability issue is that, regardless of their reasons for partici-
pating, governments that help enforce immigration law may be punished by
their residents' reluctance to engage with police and other arms of government.
Some officials will of course find that cost worthwhile, but in that case, they will
rightly be responsible for the tradeoffs of their chosen policy. Those officials
who do not find it worthwhile will still face impediments to effective govern-
ance, regardless of whether voters know the source of the policy.
Confusion may seep in here as well: even a constituent who understands
the source of, say, a notification mandate, might still wonder why the police are
less effective in some neighborhoods; that kind of causal chain is not easy for
anyone to observe. In this way, local officials are still the ones who "bear the
brunt of public disapproval."346 They also bear the brunt of private disapproval.
When the federal government makes mistakes-as when it accidentally places a
detainer on a U.S. citizen-the local government still gets sued.347 That is an ac-
344. I find it much more likely that what animated the results in New York and Printz
was far more basic: that a government whose institutions must follow the com-
mands of another is not really a separate government. See Bond v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) ("The federal balance is, in part, an end in itself, to en-
sure that States function as political entities in their own right."); Coan, supra note
343, at 18-27 (developing a "constituency-relations" rationale).
345. See Jose Gaspar, Sheriff To Continue Immigration Holds Despite New Law,
BAKERSFIELDNOw.COM (Jan. 9, 2014), http://bakersfieldnow.com/news/local/
sheriff-to-continue-immigration-holds-despite-new-law [http://perma.cc/7UK5-
DZ42].
346. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).
347. E.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F-3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014); Miranda-Olivares v. Clacka-
mas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Morales v.
Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.R.I. 2014).
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countability mechanism as well, and it does not depend on voter confusion at
all.
There are three lessons to draw from these observations. First, the blurred
accountability hypothesis is sometimes true, and not just because voters are dis-
engaged.348 When the legal status of the interaction is itself blurry, local officials
may themselves be uncertain about their options. Second, accountability is
more textured than the simple story of constituents voting against officials they
disagree with. Third, the Supreme Court's "process federalism" jurisprudence is
in some ways incomplete; while it requires Congress to present options clear-
ly,349 there is no equivalent for the Executive Branch. We lack even a vocabu-
lary, much less a doctrine, for evaluating those interactions. What are we to
make of the legal uncertainty that cooperative enforcement is capable of pro-
ducing? Should courts get involved? Should the potential for confusion inform
what we think of downward pressure as an inducement strategy? In short, for
federalism scholars, it may be too early to write off the importance of accounta-
bility. And for courts, the accountability questions lurking beneath the surface
of enforcement federalism might be just beginning.
V. ONGOING DISUNIFORMITY?
If the federal government's inducement options are limited by the right of
refusal in the ways I have suggested, one practical consequence is that many
federal regulatory schemes, including immigration, will continue to be enforced
in a geographically disparate way. In this final Part, I briefly consider what that
result signals for the intertwined futures of immigration enforcement and co-
operative federalism.
A. The Future of Immigration Enforcement
Over the last two decades, federal inducement has shifted between compet-
ing modes: negotiation and pressure; candor and secrecy. One of the biggest
questions, for the next decade and beyond, is what the dominant mode of that
interaction will be. Will there be open communication and modulation in re-
sponse to local concerns? Or will there be cut-off threats, double negatives, and
mandates? Will the choices faced by state and local governments be held out in
the open, or will they exist behind the closed doors of bureaucratic haggle?
In choosing their approaches to inducement, DHS, the President, and Con-
gress may face a certain trade-off between assistance and good will. Stronger
methods may lead to more cooperation in the short run, but, as Professor Ming
Chen has explained, subfederal officials' openness to participation is partly de-
348. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 208, at 1632 ("[I]t seems likely that citizens who pay at-
tention to public affairs and who care to inquire will be able to discern which level
of government is responsible for a government regulation, and citizens who do not
care to inquire may be largely beyond judicial or political help on the accountabil-
ity front.").
349. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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termined by the perceived legitimacy of federal action.3"o If those officials feel
disrespected-regardless of their substantive or even procedural policy views-
they may be more inclined to exercise whatever refusal rights they have.
Let us imagine that the President and DHS wanted to mollify as many local
concerns as possible. Which ones could they address? Certainly most of the sub-
stantive ones. DAPA and the Priority Enforcement Program, for instance, rep-
resent promises to change the distribution, and perhaps the intensity, of en-
forcement policy in line with some state and local preferences. Federal actors
could also address the procedural objections associated with financial cost, by
reimbursing detention costs or indemnifying litigation expenses. But they prob-
ably cannot fully address the community policing concern, which has been
widespread and consistent through multiple phases of inducement and re-
sistance.5' Nor are they likely to assuage the full range of substantive objections,
which would involve a significant scaling back of interior enforcement, some-
thing many states and localities would oppose. Because of these widely varying
local preferences, ongoing tension-and ongoing variation-is certain to per-
sist.
How should the federal government react to this disuniformity? First of all,
there are already some signs it is modulating its behavior geographically. In fis-
cal year 2013, Criminal Alien Program removals, as a percentage of the non-
citizen population, varied significantly by state, and along lines that roughly
track immigration politics.352 The use of detainers has similarly varied signifi-
cantly across states.3 53 For instance, from 2012 to mid-2013, while detainer use
dropped nationally, it dropped by much more in California (thirty-one per-
cent) than Texas (ten percent).354 Much more empirical work remains to under-
350. Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanc-
tuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (2015) (developing
an account of non-cooperation based on perceptions of federal action's legitima-
cy).
351. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 81-82 (2014) (describing
the "typical rationale" during multiple iterations being "to let unauthorized mi-
grants seek help from police and other city employees without worrying about
immigration enforcement"); Harris, supra note 54 (describing this objection in the
post-9/11 years).
352. Cantor et al., supra note 83, at 20-22. States with the highest percentages include
Texas, Arizona, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Nebraska. States with the lowest per-
centages include Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, Connecticut, and Illinois.
Id. This does not reflect anti-detainer policies, because the data largely predate the
recent wave of resistance.
353. See Targeting of ICE Detainers Varies Widely by State and by Facility,
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. n1, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/343/ [http://perma.cc/F3RW-E2XT].
354. Surprising Variability in Detainer Trends by Gender, Nationality, TRANSACTIONAL
RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Jan. 22, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
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stand federal enforcement practices, but these data suggest some real geograph-
ic variation along political lines. If true, this would be a prime example of the
"executive federalism" explored by Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen in a recent
article.35
Immigration scholars have long debated the merits of disuniformity. 6 The
case against it often starts with the word "uniform" in the Naturalization
Clause.357 But that one word says little about the wisdom of any enforcement
policy. Other uniformity advocates have pointed to spillovers. It is true that
pro-enforcement laws like Arizona's S.B. 10705 might shift immigration popu-
lations elsewhere.359 But anti-cooperation laws are much less likely to impact
other jurisdictions. Those that limit enforcement are, if anything, likely to at-
tract immigrants from places that favor tighter enforcement-exactly what the
latter places might want. Nor do anti-enforcement policies raise acute foreign
policy concerns, which typically stem from subfederal governments being too
exclusionary, not too welcoming.36 0 Finally, in the related sphere of integrating
new immigrants, we have always had great variation.361 Disuniformity, in this
context, might actually be a healthier way to negotiate some deep national con-
flicts, a way to promote the federalism values of experimentation and prefer-
ence-matching through variable federal action.
The coming years are likely to see large shifts in federal enforcement policy.
They may also witness major changes in the statutory regime governing immi-
355. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 19 (arguing that, due to bureaucratic integration and
partisan gridlock, the Executive Branch is modulating its policy across states with
respect to healthcare, marijuana, education, and climate change).
356. Compare Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Law Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2004) (con), with Peter J. Spiro, Learning To Live with Im-
migration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997) (pro).
357. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress power to "establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization").
358. S.B. 1070, 49 th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2olo).
359. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187,
35 VA. J. INT'L L. 201, 215 (1994) ("If [Proposition 187] works as intended and re-
duces the undocumented population in California, it will likely do so as much by
shifting the undocumented population to other states as by deterring its entry into
the United States as a whole."). For an argument that spillovers, even negative
ones, carry a number of benefits for the national polity, see Heather K. Gerken &
Ari Holzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV.
57 (2014).
360. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1941); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92
U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875).
361. Rodriguez, supra note 33.
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gration. During this period and beyond, the rules of inducement will set im-
portant boundaries for the structure of immigration law.362
B. The Future of Cooperative Federalism
Much work remains in fleshing out the Tenth Amendment rules of en-
gagement. Some questions are obvious; for instance, we do not yet know at
what point "pressure turns into compulsion.""' Others are less apparent on the
face of the cases, but still urgent, because their potential applications are perva-
sive. How does the coercion ban apply to local governments? What kinds of
conditional non-preemption violate the right of refusal? Does that right tolerate
federal efforts to restructure intra-state authority?
The answers will matter far beyond immigration. Countless federal regula-
tory areas involve cooperative enforcement, from marijuana, 6 4 to tax,36 5 to
healthcare,366 to national security. " Like immigration, these areas involve diffi-
cult questions of institutional design, both across the federal-state divide and
within the state. The set of available inducement options in these areas will exert
a profound influence on the depth of integration for decades to come.
These vertical dynamics also open up intriguing separation-of-powers
questions. For instance, there has been a marked difference in the nature of in-
ducement used by Congress and by administrative agencies: legislative induce-
ment has been a brighter line, while executive inducement has been more un-
certain, informal, and opaque. If it wanted, Congress could impose some
federalism-protective procedural requirements on the Fourth Branch, similar to
those in the Administrative Procedure Act.368 So could the President. Like the
APA's mandates of transparency and explanation, an "Administrative Federal-
ism Act" might require agencies to publicize and explain the nature of the
choices offered; it might also say something about which state institutions
should get input over program participation. Professor Abbe Gluck has recently
pointed out that we still have no judicial doctrine to tell us "whether state im-
plementers of federal law receive ... any 'process' when it comes to their inter-
362. See Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 8o U. CHI. L.
REv. 289, 290 (2013) (calling on immigration scholars to pay closer attention to
questions of institutional structure).
363. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2659 (2012) (quoting Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
364. See Schwartz, supra note 3.
365. See Mikos, supra note 229, at 156.
366. See Fahey, supra note 2; Gluck, supra note 313.
367. See Waxman, supra note 329.
368. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5oo et seq. (2012)).
For an argument that non-transparency in administrative federalism might be a
good thing, see Bulman-Pozen, supra note 19, at loo6-o9.
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actions with federal agencies.""6 9 The political branches could answer that ques-
tion too.
Finally, this study points to a number of questions for localism and the in-
trastate separation of powers. Most prominently, the federal practice of dissect-
ing, disaggregating, and devolving state authority merits close attention. Feder-
alism scholars have only begun to scratch the surface. In a world of increasingly
strategic federalism, federal power to restructure state governance will have a
serious impact on local politics and governance. As my case study suggests, the
allocation of authority can shape a number of substantive regulatory choices.370
Future work on cooperative federalism will need to account for both the state
and local separation of powers.
CONCLUSION
Cooperative federalism and immigration enforcement are evolving in deep-
ly intertwined ways. Because federal efforts rely so much on local aid, they have
spawned a host of inducement approaches. They include lures and bluffs, lec-
tures and meeds, gifts and commands. These approaches hed new light on fed-
eralism theory, because they provide a dense body of experience through which
to test some of the predictive and normative claims in the federalism literature.
They also illuminate federalism doctrine by providing a series of concrete case
studies with which to probe recent jurisprudence. And they may show up-in
many cases, they already have-in a host of policy arenas beyond immigration.
The right of refusal is a doctrinal tool to navigate these interactions. As Part
II explained, the right of refusal is a state's right to withhold its regulatory ser-
vices. It cuts through the Supreme Court's commandeering, coercion, and clear
notice cases, whose common concern is that states and localities, if they object
to federal policy, must be free to withhold their regulatory services. This leaves
the vast majority of inducement strategies on the table. But it casts considerable
doubt on the more forceful ones in immigration law.
The right of refusal also suggests a certain kind of decorum for American
federalism. In many ways, states are not full sovereigns. They cannot defend
themselves, or conduct foreign policy, or directly regulate migration. The feder-
al government can evict them from a whole host of policy areas when it wants
to. The right of refusal alters this dynamic slightly. It ensures that big federal
programs proceed with a certain amount of local consent, and that the federal
369. Gluck, supra note 19, at 2001.
370. There are many other examples I have not explored in this Article. One is the
mismatch between city police chiefs, who control most urban policing, and county
sheriffs, usually elected, who run the jails and thus make the more consequential
decisions about immigration enforcement. Another is the conflict, in many places,
between county legislatures and sheriffs; the former tend to prefer less immigra-
tion enforcement, the latter more. See, e.g., Angela Woodall, Alameda County
Sheriff Asked To Stop Detaining Immigrants Under Federal Program, MERCURY
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government treats state and local officials as grown-up partners, even when they
disagree. By restricting the parameters of permissible inducement, it ensures a
certain kind of dialogue.
Finally, the right of refusal sets an agenda for further thought. Scholars,
courts, mayors, sheriffs, immigrants, and citizens-all have a giant stake in two
major questions. How transparent is federal-state collaboration going forward?
And how much can federal policy vary state by state? The answers will decide
not just what kind of immigration system we have over the coming decades, but
also how viable states, counties, and cities will be as independent sites of politics
in the twenty-first century.
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